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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Public agencies spend considerable resources collecting information about passenger travel in 
household travel surveys. These data are valuable for the rich and detailed information they 
provide, which contribute to regional and statewide travel demand models. These data have 
utility beyond travel demand modeling in their application to transportation policy and travel 
behavior research. As the demands on these data increase, so have the quantity of information 
collected. Detailed geospatial referencing of the home, work and other travel destinations are 
common practice and permit the integration with other spatially archived data sources, such as 
land use characteristics, transportation system information, and other built environment, social 
and economic data. Other public agencies, private consultancies, non-profits and educational 
institutions may benefit from access to the original data with applications to areas such as public 
health, equity, transportation safety and urban planning. But wide distribution of these important 
and expensive data is limited by the requirement to protect the confidentiality of survey 
participants, who are guaranteed anonymity in exchange for participation.  
 
Given the constraint of anonymity, data are often aggregated to a geographic level such as census 
tracts or transportation analysis zones (TAZs) before being disseminated to the public, which 
limits the utility of this information. This is particularly true as the need for more spatially 
explicit information is needed for such areas as non-motorized planning, evaluation access to 
transit, local accessibility studies, health impact analysis and other interests in linking 
transportation outcomes to detailed spatial data.  
 
To address these concerns, this project aims to examine an approach to permit dissemination of 
these spatially explicit data to a wider range of public constituents, while at the same time 
protecting the identities of study participants. To this end, this project will use geographical 
perturbation methods to add noise to the original data to protect confidentiality while at the same 
time allowing the detailed geo-spatial referencing to be included in the disseminated data. To do 
this, this research: (i) reviews geographical perturbation methods that seek to protect respondent 
confidentiality; (ii) outlines a framework for examining the disclosure risk in survey data; (iii) 
tests a procedure for implementing one promising perturbation practice, referred to as the donut 
masking technique, using data from a household activity travel survey in the Portland 
metropolitan region; and (iv) examines the disclosure risk and the error introduced to data 
derived from household location using this technique.  
 
Results of this demonstration revealed that increases in the potential displacement distance of a 
geographically perturbed household generally reduced disclosure risk, but also limited data 
utility. Key guidelines from this study include:  
 
 The ideal balance of minimum disclosure risk and maximum data utility should only be sought in 
the most urban contexts, as the configuration of such a donut for a less densely populated area 
will result in the significant loss of sampled observations. 
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 For the greatest improvement in average levels of anonymity, the maximum displacement 
distance should be extended; however, the return on such an extension is less beneficial to a 
household in an urban context after one mile. 
 An improvement in the utility of the dataset with regard to employment density of the 
respondent’s census block group should be sought since this built environment measure was most 
impacted by the geographic perturbation of the actual household location. 
 When seeking to maximize the utility of density measures of the built environment, the data 
custodian should be cognizant that the specification of a scenario with a maximum displacement 
distance over one mile may introduce excessive error in rural contexts. 
 To provide an altered dataset giving adequate attention to both concepts of disclosure risk and 
data utility, the single specification of a donut masking technique to all respondents in the dataset 
should be avoided by a data custodian. 
This study has shown the promise of the donut masking technique in negotiating the balance 
between disclosure risk and data utility that is central to the distribution of a household travel 
survey dataset with heightened spatial resolution. Nevertheless, the exploratory nature of this 
application of a new geographic perturbation technique has limitations and several questions are 
reserved for future expansion of this donut masking technique.   
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Collecting household travel survey data is an expensive process requiring the expenditure of vast 
resources from public agencies. The benefit of these efforts are far-reaching for practitioners and 
researchers as these collection processes provide detailed and rich data that inform regional and 
statewide travel demand applications. Over time, these public agencies have experienced added 
pressure to extend the utility of these data sources to policy and research applications exploring 
more complex interactions between the built environment and household travel behavior. Since 
these data, prior to any post-processing effort, provide disaggregate geographic representations of 
the survey respondent’s home and work locations as well as an assortment of other spatial data 
identifying the household’s travel patterns, they may then be augmented with other spatial data 
sources describing the surrounding environment to provide a more complete picture of what factors 
are associated with certain travel outcomes. Particularly, the capability of public agencies to offer 
these disaggregate household travel survey data improves the potential for researchers to improve 
their understanding of how non-motorized travel and the built environment are related. However, 
the release of data that may be spatially referenced to an individual household raises important 
concerns regarding the preservation of survey respondent confidentiality. 
Historically, concerns regarding disclosure risk have been addressed in travel behavior research 
through the aggregation of these important and expensive data in order to adequately uphold the 
confidentiality pledge made between a survey respondent and administrator. Unfortunately, this 
practice of zonal aggregation compromises the utility of these datasets to researchers requiring a 
finer spatial representation to better understand the connection between non-motorized travel and 
the built environment since many of these trips often occur over shorter distances. Thus, there is a 
great benefit to providing these household travel data as a disaggregate representation. While 
largely unaddressed in travel behavior research, the negotiation of this barrier centered on 
minimizing the risk of identity disclosure for a survey respondent and ensuring the possibility of 
valid geographical analyses has received ample attention in other disciplines, which have sought 
to address this complication by the application of geographic perturbation methods. In general, a 
decrease in the potential for a breach of survey respondent confidentiality through the application 
of a geographic perturbation technique is directly associated with a decrease in the utility of the 
spatially altered dataset to the researcher. Although this relationship between disclosure risk and 
data utility has been established, there is no consensus on a single procedure for balancing these 
central concepts with the intention of aiding the dissemination of these valuable disaggregate data 
to a wider audience. 
 
This report offers an in-depth exploration of this overarching tradeoff by: 
 
 Examining the state of the literature with respect to geographic perturbation methods, 
disclosure risk and compromised data utility. 
 Developing a conceptual framework to guide efforts of geo-perturbation with respect to 
risk disclosure and data utility. 
 Conducting an empirical application of an innovative methodology that has the potential 
to permit the dissemination of higher resolution household travel survey data that also 
protects the confidentiality of the respondent’s household location. 
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 Quantifying the concepts of disclosure risk and data utility in this implementation of a 
geographic perturbation technique in order to improve the understanding of their tradeoff. 
 
In addressing these objectives, this report begin with a literature review describing the present 
knowledge base regarding geographic perturbation methods, strategies for evaluating disclosure 
risk and data utility, and how these disaggregate data have been used to inform research on travel 
behavior and the built environment. This review is followed by the overview of a conceptual 
framework for assessing the fundamental concepts of disclosure risk and data utility. A 
methodological strategy for evaluating these ideas is then put forward, which is followed by a 
description of the results from an empirical application of this geographic perturbation technique. 
This report concludes with the identification of general guidelines for future applications as well 
as a greater discussion of methodological limitations and directions for expansion. 
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Disaggregate data sources are favored for modeling the spatial link between household travel 
behavior and the built environment (Cervero and Kockelman, 1997; Krizek, 2003). Accordingly, 
research on this link often employs survey data specific to an individual’s residence, introducing 
a set of complications centered on protecting the participant’s confidentiality while ensuring the 
possibility of valid geographic analyses (Armstrong et al., 1999). Though largely absent in travel 
behavior research, the negotiation of this balance has recently been studied in public health 
research (Young et al., 2009) through the use of geographic masking processes in which precisely 
geocoded locations are modified to an extent considered sufficient for these data to be released to 
external users (Rushton et al., 2008). These masking processes differ from the aspatial approaches 
toward preserving statistical confidentiality, which have received considerable attention in the 
literature (Leitner and Curtis, 2006), by placing added consideration on providing spatial 
confidentiality through masking the spatial placement of an individual’s information. 
 
The masking of spatial data seeks to minimize the risk of disclosure or any breach in confidentiality 
that allows an outsider to discern either the identity of an individual or her associated attributes 
being reported under a pledge of confidentiality (Gutmann et al., 2008). The former breach, related 
to when the disclosure of a specific respondent enables a direct association to a record, is termed 
identity disclosure; while the latter breach, attribute disclosure, occurs when potentially sensitive 
information about an individual is disclosed as a result of linking a record to the respondent 
(Duncan and Lambert, 1989). A third concept of disclosure, referred to as inferential disclosure, 
occurs when the data user is able to infer new information about a respondent despite the released 
data being inexact and unassociated with the respondent’s record (Dalenius et al., 1982). 
Inferential disclosure is related to the geographical differencing problem, where confidential 
information may be gleaned by an outside user through the subtraction of data presented at 
multiple, independently safe, non-coterminous geographies (Duke-Williams and Rees, 1998). 
Each disclosure type has an intrinsic risk that the data custodian will experience as a consequence 
of releasing any particular data source (Domingo-Ferrer and Torra, 2004). This disclosure risk 
must be weighted by the data releaser against the complementary concept of data utility, which 
measures the value of the released data source to the legitimate data user. In general, decreasing 
the amount of disclosure risk by applying more stringent geographic masking processes also 
decreases the accuracy of inferences obtainable from the released data source (Karr et al., 2006). 
While there is a wide understanding of this tradeoff between disclosure risk and data utility, there 
is no consensus on a particular methodology to visualize and share confidential data without 
dramatically limiting any analyses (Curtis et al., 2011). 
2.1 GEOGRAPHIC PERTURBATION METHODS 
Traditionally, the most common geographic masking technique has been to conceal individual 
records by aggregating the records (Rushton et al., 2008). One aggregation approach, areal 
aggregation, enumerates the total existing within a predefined political or administrative entity, 
whereas a second approach, point aggregation, assigns individual records to a single location 
representing a subset of the original locations (Armstrong et al., 1999). The ubiquitousness of this 
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masking method is likely attributed to the ease for local data custodians, who may be technically 
or resource limited, to conduct this technique (Curtis et al., 2011). Armstrong et al. denoted four 
means in which the ability of the researcher to detect clusters or investigate potential relationships 
is compromised by employing aggregation (Armstrong et al., 1999). These data utility 
shortcomings of aggregation include: the absolute and relative locations of the individuals 
becoming unobservable in the geographic extent; the detectable size of clusters being limited by 
the selected aggregation scale; the requisite of spatial conformity also limiting cluster detection; 
and the geographic mismatch of collecting built environment data at a more disaggregate 
geography. Moreover, Rushton et al. (2004) note bias introduction when employing areal 
aggregation since these political or administrative entities are typically heterogeneous in terms of 
population density and demographics. Ultimately, the reduction in spatial resolution related to 
aggregation masking diminishes the data utility of the information (Kwan et al., 2004). 
 
A second set of geographical masking techniques reflect affine point transformations in which data 
points are deterministically repositioned to a new set of locations (Domingo-Ferrer and Torra, 
2004). One affine point transformation approach, translation, laterally shifts data points a 
determined distance and direction from their original location while preserving geographic scale 
(Kwan et al., 2004). Another affine point transformation method alters each data point by a 
specified scaling constant that is multiplied to each of the geographic coordinates of the original 
data point (Leitner and Curtis, 2006). This scale change technique differs from the translation 
technique because of its additional distortion of the distance between original point locations 
(Armstrong et al., 1999). A final method of affine point transformation is conducted by rotating 
the original spatial position of an individual record by a fixed angle (Armstrong et al., 1999). 
Instead of rotating the data points by using the original location as a pivot, the analyst may choose 
to translate the original data points before the rotation so as to pivot from an arbitrary location 
(Leitner and Curtis, 2006). Correspondingly, an affine transformation approach may be performed 
that utilizes any combination of these three methods of translation, scaling change, or rotation 
(Kwan et al., 2004). Also, a stochastic component may be introduced to affine transformations, 
where the randomly chosen distance and direction of displacement for relative locations would 
remain preserved (Leitner and Curtis, 2006). 
 
A third classification of geographical masking methods, random spatial perturbation, provides 
additional protection against disclosure by randomly selecting the displacement distance and 
direction for each repositioned individual record (Armstrong et al., 1999). The random spatial 
perturbation geographic masking technique has recently been referred to as jittering (French and 
Wand, 2004). Kwan, Casas, and Schmitz (2004) distinguish three subclasses of jittered data points 
in which the masked location is either randomly located along or inside the perimeter of a circle 
with a center at the original location and a chosen radius, or the masked location lies randomly 
within any other polygon defined relative to the original point. Such jittering methods may be 
employed by taking into account the population density surrounding the respondent’s location by 
skewing her address by a random offset based on a Gaussian distribution whose standard 
deviations are inversely correlated to the population density (Cassa et al., 2006). This approach 
displaces individuals residing in an area with a lower population density by larger amounts than 
their counterparts residing in urban areas characterized by a higher population density since the 
former individuals have a heightened disclosure risk (Rushton et al., 2008). One promising 
adaptive random perturbation technique ensures that a masked record is moved a minimum 
 7 
 
distance from its original location, so the perturbed position is not randomly assigned on or near 
its original location (Allshouse et al., 2010). This donut masking technique has been shown to 
greatly improve disclosure risk with a negligible impact on the specificity and sensitivity of 
detecting clustering patterns or data trends (Hampton et al., 2010). As with all jittering techniques, 
the value of the radii should be carefully selected since the greater the distance from the original 
location to the masked location, the greater the pattern attributed to the original data deviates 
(Kwan et al., 2004; Hampton et al., 2010). 
 
Additional geographic perturbation methods denoted in the literature include nearest-neighbor 
masking and geographic masking with contextual information (Armstrong et al., 1999). In the 
nearest-neighbor masking method, only the distance between an individual record and the nearest 
record(s) of interest is reported, which is often sufficient for clustering analyses (Rushton, 2006). 
Furthermore, certain cluster analyses (e.g., Cuzick-Edwards statistic) also require attribute 
knowledge of the nearest neighbor (Leitner and Curtis, 2006). To ensure confidentiality, no 
additional information aside from the distances to, and identity of, the two nearest neighbors 
exhibiting a particular attribute may be provided since it may be possible for an outside data user 
to detect the existing pattern and recreate the relative locations (Armstrong et al., 1999). In 
contrast, the contextual information method removes any geographic identification from the 
dataset and substitutes it with contextual information that is of interest to the data user (Gutmann, 
2008). Analysis of the contextual information method has found that the use of smaller geographies 
for gleaning the contextual information presents an inappropriately high potential for disclosure 
risk (Armstrong et al., 1999). 
 
2.2 EVALUATION OF GEOGRAPHIC PERTURBATION METHODS 
As previously mentioned, the protection of anonymity, along with the preservation of information 
and structure, are two elements of importance to a user of data provided under a pledge of 
confidentiality. Similar to the lack of agreement on which geographic masking technique for the 
data custodian to employ, there is also no consensus regarding the amount of disclosure risk that 
is deemed acceptable (VanWey et al., 2005) and, accordingly, there are a number of statistical 
approaches to quantify any such risk disclosure (Leitner and Curtis, 2006). One such 
confidentiality measure, k-anonymity, is a special case of k-map protection where security is 
provided to ensure that released information may only be mapped to k incorrect entities (Sweeney, 
2002). In terms of spatial representation, k-anonymity refers to the number of households whose 
jittered position is closer to the original location than the distance of displacement attributed to the 
geographic masking technique (Allshouse et al., 2010). Another statistical approach is Spruill’s 
measure in which the squared distance between the masked location and original location is 
calculated and then the percentage of masked records closer to the original location than any other 
of the original locations is computed. This percentage of the geographically masked locations 
found to lie nearest to their original location is next multiplied by the sampling fraction to 
determine the degree of disclosure risk (Duncan and Lambert, 1989). A third broadly employed 
method for evaluating confidentiality preservation is to measure the area of a confidence region, 
covering a specified range of probability, for the true location of a spatially perturbed location 
(Rushton et al., 2008; Zimmerman and Pavlik, 2008). Zimmerman and Pavlik’s research has 
employed this measure for disclosure risk in scenarios where multiple geographical masks have 
been applied to the original dataset. Finally, Rushton et al. (2008) denote a number of lesser-
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utilized methods for measuring disclosure risk that include a measure of vulnerability to local 
geographic knowledge and a measure detailing the minimum number of masked locations, which 
may be linked to the original dataset by obvious identifying attributes that would compromise the 
entire geographically masked dataset. 
 
As a complement to minimizing disclosure risk, the data custodian must also attempt to preserve 
the utility of the content associated with the geographically masked data as well as the relationships 
between the point data and the resource characteristics of it surrounding spatial landscape. The 
challenge being that the data custodian is usually not in a position to predict the needs of the future 
data user and, accordingly, may need to examine the preservation capabilities of the data along 
several dimensions (Armstrong et al., 1999). One approach to be considered by the data custodian 
is the calculation of test statistics to determine whether the statistically significant spatial attributes 
in the original dataset remain significant in the perturbed dataset (Leitner and Buttenfield, 2000). 
A second approach is to examine whether the masked data preserves the distances and directions 
to relevant geographic features that were initially observed in the original point data (Armstrong 
et al., 1999). Another set of methods commonly used to examine the preservation of data utility 
includes point-pattern analyses such as the kernel estimation of density surfaces, cross-K 
functions, or more informal visualizations of clustering patterns (Kwan et al., 2004; Olson et al., 
2006). The location of these clusters is often more important than the mere existence of spatial 
clustering (Armstrong et al., 1999). Finally, similar to the detection of spatial clustering, the data 
custodian may also anticipate the necessity to maintain any monotonic trends, and their 
directionality, in the masked dataset that were exhibited in the original point data (Armstrong et 
al., 1999). Ultimately, the data custodian must carefully consider the concept of data utility, as 
each geographic perturbation technique results in the loss of some original spatial information to 
the data user and some approaches preserve more valuable information than others (Rushton et al., 
2008). 
2.3 TRAVEL BEHAVIOR AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
Guiding this research is the desire to put forth a geographic perturbation method that permits the 
confidential release of valuable disaggregate household data, which will in turn improve the 
quality of research into the connection between household travel behavior and the built 
environment. The past inability to release such data has been an obstacle toward an improved 
understanding of the linkages that exist between travel behavior and the built environment because 
these disaggregate data are most suitable to study since they circumvent the methodological 
concern of an ecological fallacy (Handy et al., 2002). Accordingly, past studies of the relationship 
between household travel patterns and the built environment have been suspect of any inferential 
comparison of the disaggregate housing unit to a more aggregate representation of neighborhood 
(Goulias and Kim, 2001; Bhat and Zhao, 2002) and have confirmed the inherent risk of aggregating 
household data into the zones traditionally exhibited in four-step travel demand models 
(Chikaraishi et al., 2009). To avoid this modeling pitfall, travel behavior research has continued to 
advance in the direction of employing activity-based travel demand models that rely extensively 
on disaggregate built environment and socioeconomic measures in order to properly capture their 
effects on observed household travel (Badoe and Miller, 2000; Davidson et al., 2007). 
Understanding these relationships has become ever more imperative as regional travel demand 
models continue to increasingly account for non-motorized travel modes (Rodriguez and Joo, 
2004). 
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Previous literature on the connection between travel behavior and the built environment has been 
systematically reviewed by classifying the latter element as “D” variables (Ewing and Cervero, 
2010). While a seemingly infinite number of built environment measures may be considered for 
any research into the transportation-land use link, this research has chosen to focus on a handful 
of measures related to density, design and distance to transit. In terms of population density and 
non-motorized travel, Frank and Pivo (1994) found that walking trips were most sensitive to 
increases in population density at the trip origin. Greenwald and Boarnet (2001) found that 
population density had a significant connection to walking for discretionary trip purposes when 
operationalized at the census block group, but not when measured at the more regional ZIP code 
boundary. Often used as a complement to population density, Cervero (2006) found increased 
employment density reduced the odds of vehicle ownership. An and Chen (2007) found 
employment density, when reflected at the census block group, had the strongest power in 
predicting non-motorized mode shares. Intersection density, a design measure that represents 
opportunity for path choice, was found by Schlossberg et al. (2006) to be a significant predictor of 
walking for school trips, which echoed the link found in past studies that note this measure of 
network connectivity to be a significant predictor of walking (Frank et al., 2008). Aside from built 
environment measures of density and design, past travel behavior research has also focused on 
accessibility measures examining the distance to the nearest bus stop or rail station. In regard to 
distance to the nearest bus stop, Targa and Clifton (2005) found that individuals residing closer to 
a bus stop tended to generate more walking trips, while Susilo et al. (2012) echoed past research 
by finding that a shorter distance to the nearest bus stop promotes public transport use. As for 
distance to the nearest rail station, Chatman (2009) found that residents living within one-half mile 
of a heavy rail station significantly conducted more discretionary transit trips, while Chen et al. 
(2008) found that long distances to public transit stations increased the propensity to drive for 
home-based work tours. 
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3.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DISCLOSURE RISK 
AND DATA UTILITY 
Understanding that household travel surveys inherently provide characteristics of the individual or 
their household unit to the data collector and as such make any complete avoidance of disclosure 
risk all but impossible, great importance is placed upon the data custodian to control or limit the 
potential of any breach in the confidentiality pledge between the survey respondent and data 
collector. However, there is no general agreement on what constitutes a tolerable level of 
disclosure risk or how to sufficiently guarantee the anonymity of the survey respondent. Moreover, 
disclosure risk may not always be related to a breach in confidentiality caused by the illegitimate 
use of the geographically explicit dataset to infer confidential individual information. Such an 
exception is termed inferential disclosure (Duncan and Lambert, 1989) and occurs when the 
release of a dataset leads to the potential to disclose confidential information about an individual 
who is not the survey respondent. While out of this report’s scope, which is inferential, attacks and 
data intruder behavior have been discussed in past literature on the topic (Paass, 1988; Fuller, 
1993). Instead, this report is centered on the principle that public and private agencies must 
consider disclosure risk from the perspective of both the data intruder and legitimate data user in 
order to effectively evaluate the competing concepts of disclosure risk and data utility for different 
transportation-land use applications.  
 
Assessing the complex tradeoffs between disclosure risk and data utility has proven to be largely 
heuristic and may be based on any number of assumptions and scenarios. Thus, a theoretical 
framework that provides a coherent and consistent method for evaluating these tradeoffs is 
essential toward any study aimed at providing an implementable methodology. The proceeding 
discussion provides a conceptual framework, separated into three steps, to consider when 
developing a methodological approach for releasing spatially sensitive household travel survey 
data. In the first step in this proposed framework, a hierarchical evaluation of disclosure risk is 
performed in which the researcher considers what records ought to be geographically perturbed. 
Having given ample consideration toward minimizing disclosure risk in this first step, the 
researcher then addresses the complementary concept of data utility by noting which data are most 
valuable for the analysis of interest and therefore require a higher level of spatial resolution. 
Finally, the third step balances these competing concepts of disclosure risk and data utility in the 
selection of an appropriate geographic perturbation method. The objective of this last step in the 
theoretical framework is to minimize the potential of disclosure risk that was determined in the 
first step, while deciding on the maximum tolerance for introduced spatial error to the original 
dataset that is considered in the second step. 
3.1 EVALUATION OF DISCLOSURE RISK 
Disclosure in the context of this report is understood to be the identification of a sample record in 
a released dataset that has occurred without any prior knowledge of the survey respondent being 
part of the sampled dataset and the recognition of additional attributes of the survey respondent 
(Fellegi, 1972). Identity and attribute disclosure risk were discussed in the literature review and 
are reflected in the three-tiered hierarchical framework for evaluating confidentiality disclosure 
illustrated in Figure 3-1 (Clifton and Noyan, 2012). The divisions of disclosure risk into separate 
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tiers within this framework distinguishes the likelihood of identity and attribute disclosure 
occurring as well as the type of additional information required by the data intruder to extract such 
confidential data. Such an evaluation of disclosure risk requires certain assumptions about the 
goals of the data intruder to be established by the individual responsible for disseminating the data 
source. By establishing assumptions about the motivation and state of knowledge characterizing 
the data intruder, this report puts forward a standard approach for conducting a hierarchical 
evaluation of information tiers with respect to disclosure risk. Intuitively, this hierarchical 
framework suggests that the geographic perturbation of the original dataset must increase as the 
data custodian moves down the tiers of the disclosure risk hierarchy. A greater discussion of each 
of these three tiers is provided in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Hierarchical framework of disclosure risk and data utility 
The first tier of the hierarchical evaluation framework of disclosure risk reflects the release of 
information that provides the data intruder with the most obviously identifiable information about 
the survey respondent. This type of disclosed information, referred to as a direct identifier, 
provides the data intruder with the ability to directly associate an individual, household or 
workplace to a sampled record within a publicly released dataset. This highest level of disclosure 
risk is the realization of this one-to-one correspondence; however, the assignment of such a risk 
does not completely depend on the level of disclosure risk, but also the degree of analytical effort 
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required by the data intruder to make this direct association. The realization of this one-to-one 
correspondence between the perturbed sample record and the identity of the survey respondent 
without any external information or additional effort from the data intruder is classified as a first-
tier risk and the worst degree of disclosure risk. Such records require an added level of data 
masking, which may be achieved through the application of a geographic perturbation method, to 
ensure these flagged sample records are provided with an ample amount of anonymity. 
 
However, after the first-tier analysis is completed on the household travel survey dataset by the 
data custodian, sensitive information about the survey respondent that is inferable by a data 
intruder may remain. The second tier of analysis within the hierarchical evaluation framework 
begins to address this possibility of identity and attribute disclosure that may occur with added 
effort by the data intruder using supplemental data sources. In this second tier, the data custodian 
must be cognizant of more subtle disclosure risks within the collected dataset that arise because of 
sample size or the existence of unique sampled records. Moreover, the data custodian must now 
consider a series of assumptions that pertain to the possible familiarity of the data intruder with 
elements of the dataset and their intention for establishing any direct one-to-one correspondence. 
One such assumption is that the data intruder may be willing to use external, publicly available 
data sources to disclose the identity or attributes of the respondent.  
 
This level of disclosure risk in which the potential exists for a data intruder to disclose the identity 
and attributes of the survey respondent through the complementary use of easily accessible public 
datasets, such as those provided by the U.S. Census, is termed second-tier risk. While this level of 
risk analysis does not assume any local knowledge by the data intruder of the survey respondents 
or study area, there is an assumption that the data intruder will use common identifiers such as 
income, race or household size to increase the prospects of a direct correspondence between the 
perturbed sample record and actual respondent. The motivation of the data intruder and analytical 
skill set is greater in this second level of disclosure risk and, accordingly, the data custodian must 
place greater thought toward ensuring respondent confidentiality. 
 
For instance, the data custodian who is evaluating this second-tier disclosure risk should place 
greater attention on any geographic identifiers detailed in the collected dataset. Information for 
similar geographies such as census blocks, while likely independently safe, may be spatially 
compared to attain distributional characteristics and reveal information to the public that was 
unintended. One desired result of the spatial aggregation of census data is the difficulty of making 
any direct correspondence that would jeopardize respondent confidentiality. Yet, there still exists 
the potential to link the behaviors of similar populations or at the very least discard more unlikely 
hypotheses. For unique observations within the collected dataset, uncovering general trends about 
the individual’s census block may provide the extra information needed by the data intruder to 
reveal the individual’s identity and attributes. It is at this step that the data custodian should 
conduct an extensive review of widely available datasets to the public that may be utilized to infer 
variations in socio-demographic or built environment attributes across the geographic entities at 
which survey respondents are allocated.  
 
Undoubtedly, any review process requires greater effort by the data custodian and also raises 
questions regarding the temporal and substantive relevance of identified datasets. Within the 
former tier of the hierarchical framework the data custodian only needed to be aware of trends 
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within their collected dataset; however, in a second-tier analysis, the data custodian is now required 
to understand historical and general growth patterns across the geographies comprising the study 
area. While the growth rates and patterns across a more urban context are more likely to be more 
dynamic, the same trends revealed for a rural context may experience little variation over longer 
stretches of time. In such instances, certain data from an older resource may continue to inform 
the perturbation decisions of the data custodian, while other data may have become temporally 
irrelevant.  
 
Aside from the decision of whether the relevance of identified data sources has expired, the data 
custodian evaluating within this second tier of disclosure risk must also contemplate the substance 
or accuracy reported within these external datasets. Datasets vary in regard to the accuracy levels 
of their collected information, thus the data custodian must understand how these accuracy levels 
differ from their collected dataset in terms of reported variables and geographies. As with the 
temporal discussion, outliers must be given greater attention when examining the accuracy of 
secondary data sources since these unique records are more susceptible to disclosure risk. The 
likelihood of disclosure increases with improved geographic accuracy since a reduction in the 
number of records within an aggregated geography will reduce the screening of a unique record 
from the pool of respondents. This occurrence may create a serious consequence since it could 
lead to the identification of a unique record that may be highly valued in the dataset due to its 
uncommon attributes. Comparing the survey data against all temporally relevant public datasets 
will help to inform what sampled records may require greater geographic displacement in order to 
avoid a second-tiered risk of disclosure. 
 
Similar to middle tier in the hierarchical framework for disclosure risk, the final tier calls for the 
geographic perturbation of the survey dataset due to increased potential for identity and attribute 
disclosure as a result of a data intruder incorporating external secondary sources. A main difference 
between the second and third tiers is the assumption made by the data custodian in the third tier 
that the data intruder has some local knowledge or experience. The assignment of a third-tier 
disclosure risk to a record denotes that any inference depends on not only a finer level of 
knowledge and experience, but also a heightened analytical skill set and investigative effort by the 
data intruder. The evaluation of a second-tier risk centered on ensuring that anonymity was 
maintained in regard to commonly recorded socio-demographic and economic characteristics, but 
a third-tier analysis must also account  for those attributes disclosed by the survey respondent that 
necessitate more specific knowledge about the respondent or her community in order to establish 
a one-to-one correspondence. This local intimate knowledge of a survey respondent, which may 
include individual attributes such as typical commute mode choice, is not deemed essential to 
guard against in this hierarchical framework, but should be considered and evaluated by the data 
custodian prior to any public dissemination of the dataset. This is due to a number of reasons 
including the difficulty in understanding what assumptions to make about a data intruder’s local 
knowledge and the increased potential of a third-tiered risk occurring after a dataset has already 
been made public. Any best effort by a data custodian to avoid the identity and attribute disclosure 
of a survey respondent may be weakened - despite careful consideration of any number of 
assumptions about the data intruder’s knowledge and effort - by the future release of a secondary 
dataset. 
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3.2 EVALUATION OF DATA UTILITY 
The assessment of data utility, which describes the value of the geographically perturbed 
information to the researcher, balances the previous consideration of disclosure risk. After 
selecting an acceptable level of disclosure risk to protect the confidentiality of the survey 
respondent based on the aforementioned hierarchy, the data custodian must then consider the 
usefulness of the geographically perturbed dataset to the researcher. Similar to the hierarchical 
evaluation of disclosure risk, this second step within the conceptual framework poses several 
challenges to the data custodian revolving around the degree of resolution needed for a specific 
application and the selection of an acceptable level of introduced spatial error. Also, the data 
custodian is likely unaware of all potential future applications of the perturbed dataset at the time 
of its release, scenarios in which the researcher would like to have greater spatial resolution or less 
error. As such, this evaluation of data utility may be more appropriately thought of as a second 
step within an iterative process rather than as an independent step following the completion of any 
disclosure risk evaluation. 
 
Estimating the utility of a geographically perturbed dataset is reliant on attributes of the survey 
respondents that are of interest to the researcher. Accordingly, while data utility may be thought 
of in terms of the overall collection of attributes found in a released dataset, considerable variation 
exists across individual records and the attributes describing these sampled records. Thus, when 
assessing the utility of a perturbed dataset, each attribute must be evaluated based upon its 
distribution within the sample as well as the composition of the attribute. Whether the variable is 
continuous or discrete in nature, and how the variable may be compared to other collected 
attributes of the individual, must also be considered within this step. At the very least, the data 
custodian must consider these aspects of data utility at a spatial resolution suitable to the majority 
of applications the collected dataset was envisioned to inform. This helps to understand the direct 
and complex relationships between better-quality resolution and an acceptable tolerance for 
introduced spatial error. 
 
Since this second step in the theoretical framework is difficult to describe in the abstract, two 
potential applications for implementing a geographic perturbation method to household travel 
surveys are discussed in the following paragraphs to better ground this discussion of data utility 
evaluation. For instance, household travel surveys commonly ask a respondent to approximate her 
annual household income in order to use the information in a host of transportation planning 
applications, such as trip-generation models. In this illustration, one application of a trip-
generation model may estimate the number of trips conducted by an individual or household with 
a regression equation where income is represented as a continuous attribute and where the tolerable 
error depends on the sensitivity of the estimated regression model to household income. Another 
trip-generation application may utilize a cross classification method relating average individual or 
household trip rates to a discrete number of income brackets. The aggregation of household income 
in the latter trip-generation models is less sensitive to the introduction of spatial error than the 
former application, which would be less tolerable to introduced error in the dataset. 
 
In addition to the estimation of trip-generation models, data from household travel surveys are 
being more frequently used to examine the relationship between non-motorized mode choice and 
a household’s surrounding built environment. In the past, travel demand models have been almost 
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solely interested in examining automotive travel at a more aggregated geographic scale; however, 
advances in travel demand modeling techniques interested in alternative travel modes have 
powered the need for releasing disaggregate trip-end representations. Previous transportation 
models that represented the household unit at aggregate spatial scales such as a traffic analysis 
zones or census geographies were more tolerable of greater errors in travel time and distance. 
When examining alternative travel modes, especially non-motorized modes, this aggregate 
geographic scale becomes less suitable due to shorter travel distances that lead to a 
disproportionate level of intra-zonal trips. However, as with the release of a continuous 
representation of household income in lieu of a categorical representation, the improved utility of 
a more disaggregate dataset, specifying the spatial location of the trip origin and destination, also 
brings a heightened prospect of disclosure risk. Surprisingly, there exists a dearth in transportation 
literature objectively examining the geographic extent most appropriate for studying the 
relationship between non-motorized mode choice and the built environment. This limitation adds 
to the difficulty in defining an acceptable tolerance for introduced spatial error. Yet, one may 
imagine the output of a transportation model estimating ridership originating at a specific bus stop 
or rail station may be biased if household locations are allowed to be geographically perturbed a 
distance beyond what is deemed to be accessible to pedestrians. 
 
The above examples illustrate the complexity of evaluating data utility in comparison to its 
counterpart of disclosure risk. Not only are transportation agencies less likely to predict all of the 
potential uses of their collected datasets, but researchers have also limited their understanding of 
what levels of introduced error are acceptable in more recent applications. Given these present 
shortcomings, the data custodian may defer any long evaluation into preserving data utility after 
the completion of the final step in this theoretical framework. 
3.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF A GEOGRAPHIC PERTURBATION 
TECHNIQUE 
In an ideal succession through the conceptual framework, at this point, the data custodian will have 
evaluated both disclosure risk and data utility so as to provide anonymity to the survey respondent 
and produce the most useful dataset to the researcher’s application. Having struck some balance 
between the objectives of minimizing disclosure risk and maximizing data utility, or simply 
settling on a required degree of anonymity to enable the dataset’s public release, the data custodian 
will then select the most appropriate geographic perturbation technique. The prior literature review 
described the three common classes of geographic perturbation techniques that may be applied to 
the dataset by the data custodian: aggregation, affine point transformation, and random geographic 
perturbation. The focus of this final step in the theoretical framework is to explore these different 
methodologies in the context of (1) the overall tradeoffs of perturbing the dataset in regard to the 
disclosure risk and data utility, and (2) the effectiveness of different geographic perturbation 
techniques at protecting personal privacy and providing accurate analytical results. In the end, the 
application of a specific geographic perturbation technique will be determined by the selected risk 
tier and intended application of the collected dataset. 
 
By implementing an aggregation method to geographically perturb the original dataset, whether 
through a zonal or point technique, the data custodian is selecting a strategy that will likely result 
in an imbalance between disclosure risk and data utility. The application of an aggregation method, 
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as found in past travel demand models representing activity at the traffic analysis zone, is likely to 
provide an adequate level of anonymity to mask the survey respondent from detection by a data 
intruder, but at the tradeoff of limited data utility. As previously mentioned, the representation of 
travel survey data at a large geographic scale hinders the ability of the analyst interested in non-
motorized travel to draw many meaningful conclusions. This unevenness that places more 
emphasis on minimizing disclosure risk than maximizing data utility reflected by the use of an 
aggregation method is shifted when applying an affine point transformation to the original dataset. 
In an affine point transformation, the data utility is generally improved due to the finer resolution 
associated with the disaggregate representation of the record; however, the deterministic 
positioning of the geographically perturbed records increases the risk of the respondent having her 
confidentiality compromised. The randomization in the positioning of the disaggregate sample 
record, which characterizes the third class of geographic perturbation methods, enables the data 
custodian to provide both the resolution necessary for maximizing data utility as well as the 
anonymity necessary for minimizing disclosure risk. While the random spatial perturbation gives 
the data custodian the opportunity to balance disclosure risk and data utility, the implementation 
of this geographic perturbation method requires a strong understanding by the data custodian of 
how these two themes interact across different techniques and applications of the dataset. 
 
For common applications, such as the use of household travel survey data for regional travel 
demand modeling, the data custodian may provide information to the researcher describing the 
level of anonymity and error introduced to the geographically perturbed dataset. Information on 
the former theme would provide the agency with an idea of what the minimum level of anonymity 
is for records in the spatially perturbed dataset, whereas measures of the error or confidence 
intervals would provide the agency a sense about the latter theme. Given that agencies will have 
both the original and spatially manipulated datasets in their possession, an analyst may then be 
able to evaluate the impact that the use of a selected geographical perturbation technique will have 
on the intended application of the data. Since the range of potential uses for such data is unknown, 
and probably incompletely understood by the agency at the time of receiving the processed dataset, 
it is best for the agency to examine the best compromise of disclosure risk and data utility whenever 
a new application of the data is considered. In this sense, the evaluation of disclosure risk and data 
utility becomes an ongoing exercise dependent on the selection of geographic perturbation 
technique and application of the collected dataset. However, given that resources are limited, the 
evaluation of the scenario with the lowest risk of disclosure that produces an acceptable amount 
of error seems sufficient for common or foreseeable applications. 
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4.0 METHODOLOGY 
In an attempt to empirically test the above theoretical framework, the remainder of this report 
explores the application of one promising geographic perturbation technique aimed toward 
reducing the risk of identity disclosure while maintaining data utility. This particular application 
of a random geographic perturbation technique has been guided by the desire to avoid a first-tier 
risk of identity disclosure and the complementary motivation of quantifying how an increased level 
of survey respondent anonymity relates to the utility of the dataset. Specifically, this methodology 
is designed to provide information on how the random geographic perturbation of a survey 
respondent’s household relates to the utility of a selection of built environment measures 
commonly estimated in models exploring the linkage between non-motorized travel and the built 
environment. The following discussion will describe the technique selected for this empirical 
application, the statistical measures used to evaluate disclosure risk and data utility, and the 
datasets used for this particular implementation. 
4.1 RANDOM GEOGRAPHIC PERTURBATION TECHNIQUE 
Directed by the increasing desire of transportation researchers for a wider dissemination of 
household travel survey data that represents the unit of analysis at a finer geographic resolution 
and the inability of agencies to publicly release these disaggregate data for fear of compromising 
the confidentiality pledge established between the respondent and survey administrator, this 
research examines the empirical implementation of an innovative geographic perturbation 
technique. Conceptually, this application of the selected technique begins with the geographic 
identification of the survey respondent’s household and the construction of a circular buffer 
extending outward from the respondent’s household location. The perimeter of this first circle 
represents the minimum distance that the geographically perturbed household must be repositioned 
in order to adequately ensure the household has a sufficient level of anonymity to prevent a one-
to-one correspondence and subsequent identity disclosure of the survey respondent. 
 
The established circle represents an exclusion area in which the geographically perturbed 
household cannot be positioned within. Next, the data custodian constructs a second circular buffer 
that also extends outward from the original household location. The perimeter of this second circle 
represents the maximum displacement distance that the survey respondent’s household location 
may eventually be geographically perturbed. Meanwhile, the area of this circle represents the 
displacement area that the household location will be repositioned. Similar to the first buffer, the 
data custodian is responsible for the selection of the radius of this second circular buffer around 
the household location, which will help inform the utility of the altered dataset. Completion of this 
latest step generates a torus or donut-shaped area with the original household located at the center, 
which represents the potential area that a household may now be randomly repositioned. Figure 4-
1 provides an illustration outlining the general steps taken toward implementing this random 
geographic perturbation procedure. The donut masking technique, which has not been previously 
examined in transportation-related research, was only recently introduced as a promising random 
geographic perturbation technique in the field of public health research (Allshouse et al., 2010; 
Hampton et al., 2010). 
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Figure 4-1: Conceptual steps in applying the donut masking technique 
Provided with this conceptual description of how the donut masking technique may be applied to 
a household travel survey dataset, a number of questions arise concerning the selection of an inner- 
and outer-ring radius. Considerable attention must be given by the data custodian in the selection 
of an inner-ring radius that provides a sufficient level of anonymity as well as an outer-ring radius 
that ensures only an acceptable amount of spatial error is introduced in the geographically 
perturbed dataset. While the selection of these separate radii appears somewhat subjective in 
nature, the data custodian must be able to somehow quantitatively justify the selection of these 
distances bounding the donut-shaped area. In order to achieve this objective within this application, 
the selection of an inner-ring radius has been linked to a statistical measure of anonymity found in 
the information sciences, while the selection of an outer-ring radius is informed by general rules 
of thumb found in transportation planning research. 
 
As noted in the literature review, there have been a variety of statistical methods explored by 
researchers in an attempt to accurately quantify the level of anonymity that a geographically 
perturbed household has been provided. Instinctively, the anonymity of a survey respondent in this 
geographic context is a function of the underlying population density of the area surrounding the 
individual’s spatial location. Thus, any statistical reflection of anonymity in a geographic 
perturbation technique must be directly linked to the number of additional individuals or 
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households found within the exclusion area of the donut. By utilizing the k-anonymity concept 
introduced by Sweeney (2002), where k is a value representing the total number of households, 
the original household location cannot be reversely identified (Cassa et al., 2006). Allshouse et al. 
(2010) provided the following operationalization of this concept of anonymity, which may be 
rearranged to reflect an inner-ring radius for the donut masking technique informed by the selection 
of a k-anonymity level by the data custodian. 
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In the above equation, the estimated k-anonymity statistics is equal to the product of pi and the 
square of the straight-line distance from the household location, d, multiplied by the number of 
occupied households within the survey respondent’s census tract, N, divided by the land area of 
the household’s census tract. The use of census tract as the geographical representation of the 
household’s surrounding population adds a restriction on the exclusion area where the 
geographically perturbed location of the household must remain within the original census tract. 
Hampton et al. (2010) described this strategy in applying the donut masking technique as well as 
a second approach in which the spatially perturbed household is allowed to be positioned outside 
of its original census tract. The implementation of the latter strategy would be suitable if the data 
custodian has access to a disaggregate representation of the population; however, since such data 
are not widely available, the data custodian may be more likely to select the former strategy. In 
the restricted approach, which was selected for this exploration, the choice of a higher k-anonymity 
statistic may lead to a scenario where the exclusion area is not circular in shape due to the 
household being located in proximity to the boundary of a census tract. 
 
As a complement to the choice of an inner-ring radius and its relationship with the minimization 
of disclosure risk is the decision of an outer-ring radius and its relationship with the maximization 
of data utility. In this implementation of the donut masking technique, the choice of an outer-ring 
radius represents the maximum distance a household may be repositioned from its original 
geographic site. In general, the choice of a greater outer-ring radius has a direct connection with 
the acceptance of a greater amount of spatial error being introduced to the geographically perturbed 
dataset. Accordingly, the data custodian must consider the amount of spatial error that can be 
introduced to the dataset given the intended application of the data. Also, as the choice of an initial 
threshold for displacement distance is somewhat arbitrary since no evaluation of data utility may 
be conducted until the household has been geographically perturbed, this decision of an outer-ring 
radius should also be guided by theory or common practice. In studying the link between non-
automotive travel and the built environment, researchers often employ straight-line buffers 
extending from the household’s physical location (Clifton et al., 2009), which are drawn at a 
distance covering the range that an individual would likely consider when walking. A number of 
studies have examined the built environment within one-half mile or one mile areal buffers 
(Krizek, 2003; McGinn et al., 2007), while others have looked at the built environment within 
smaller one-quarter mile buffers (Lee and Mouden, 2006) or larger one and one-half mile buffers 
(Schlossberg, 2006). Consequently, the application of these distances for the outer-ring radius may 
be seen as justifiable choices. 
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Additionally, the data custodian may wish to select an outer-ring radius that is greater in length 
when considering more rural settings. Reasons supporting this consideration may include either 
the perception that the built environment does not vary as much across rural contexts in comparison 
to more urban areas or the potential of the inner-ring radius exceeding the outer-ring radius. The 
latter condition must be investigated by the data custodian since the collapsing of the donut will 
result in the household not being geographically perturbed, but instead left in its original 
disaggregate position. Such an instance would produce an estimated k-anonymity statistic with a 
value of one and compromise the anonymity of the survey respondent by creating a one-to-one 
correspondence. This decision to be made by the data custodian underscores the importance of 
selecting an appropriate inner-ring and outer-ring radius since the two are not explicitly connected 
to one another. Finally, as with the creation of the exclusion area, the generation of the donut may 
also be inhibited by the boundary of the census tract if the chosen maximum displacement distance 
extends beyond the geographical unit in any particular direction.  Similarly, the close proximity of 
any water feature may constrain the area of the donut since only land area is considered for a 
geographically perturbed household location in this application. 
4.2 QUANTIFYING DISCLOSURE RISK AND DATA UTILITY 
Having defined the inner-ring radius based on a chosen estimated k-anonymity statistic and the 
outer-ring by an accessible walking distance, the data custodian must now select a measure to 
quantify the concepts of disclosure risk and data utility. While the decision of what combination 
of radii is somewhat of a subjective effort, the quantitative expression of these two themes allows 
the data custodian to better inform the researcher of what level of anonymity and spatial error 
exists in the geographically perturbed dataset. Being apprised of these measures subsequently 
enables the researcher to decide whether these levels are appropriate for the specific type of 
application under consideration. For instance, a researcher may decide that the introduction of 
spatial error to a dataset describing the relationship between repositioned household locations and 
a specific measure of the built environment is above a threshold of her likening for a study into the 
link between non-motorized mode choice and the built environment. Therefore, the researcher may 
require an application of the donut masking technique to the original dataset that presents less 
spatial error. At this point, the data custodian must determine whether the release of a more precise 
dataset would compromise the anonymity of survey respondents from a data intruder. If not, then 
the researcher must reassess her intended use of the altered dataset. 
 
In this methodology, a version of the estimated k-anonymity statistic used to define the inner-ring 
radius of the donut was also utilized to help express the potential for a data intruder to successfully 
make a one-to-one correspondence of the perturbed household location with the actual location of 
the survey respondent. Unlike the choice of a k-anonymity statistic in defining the exclusion area 
of the donut by stating the absolute minimum number of households that a geographically 
perturbed household could potentially be mistaken for, the use of k-anonymity in representing 
respondent confidentiality is a summary measure. The reason for this being a summary statistic is 
that the data custodian must try a number of simulations for spatially perturbing the original 
household location in order to better understand the overall behavior of anonymity within a 
selected trial of inner- and outer-ring sizes. When randomly repositioning a household within a 
donut resulting from some specified combination of inner- and outer-ring radii, a greater 
discrepancy between the two ring sizes will lead to a widening gap between the absolute minimum 
k-anonymity and the average k-anonymity statistic. If the inner ring is held constant and the outer 
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ring, which reflects the absolute maximum k-anonymity, is allowed to increase, then the range of 
potential k-anonymity values widens across the different simulations. As such, the selection of a 
higher number of simulations will better enable the data custodian to describe the distribution of 
k-anonymity statistics within a specified donut. Therefore, for this exploration of the donut 
masking technique, there were 50 simulations completed to describe the minimum, maximum, 
median, and mean k-anonymity statistic for a particular scenario. These measures inform the 
potential for identity disclosure risk in the produced geographically perturbed dataset. 
 
To quantify the contending concept of data utility, the summary statistic of percent root mean 
square error (PRMSE) was calculated across the 50 simulations for a chosen combination of inner- 
and outer-ring radii. This measure of spatial error was calculated using the following formulation. 
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In the above equation, x represents the value of a built environment measure in relation to the 
actual household location, whereas xi represents the value of the same built environment measure 
in relation to the geographically perturbed location of the household and N represents the number 
of simulations within each scenario. The PRMSE of a selected built environment measure is 
calculated for each sampled record in the spatially perturbed dataset with the estimated PRMSE 
values then being averaged across the entire sample to produce a single statistic to represent spatial 
error. Since the magnitude of built environment measures is likely to range across different 
contexts, the representation of spatial error with one such aggregate statistic may not provide 
sufficient information to the researcher about the degree of variation found within an altered 
dataset. Therefore, the data custodian may choose to calculate this expression of data utility across 
different classifications of the built environment measure of interest in order to provide the data 
researcher with a glimpse at how spatial error fluctuates in these discrete categories. The data 
custodian may decide to divide the average PRMSE of a built environment variable based on any 
number of schemes including natural breaks or manual classification. 
4.3 EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
To further explore these representations of disclosure risk and data utility, an empirical application 
of the donut masking technique was conducted in the Portland metropolitan region. Figure 4-2 
provides a map of the three-county study area covering Multnomah, Washington and Clackamas 
counties. Within this region, the connections between 4,824 households and five measures of the 
built environment were investigated. Data on the geographic locations of the households were 
provided by the Oregon Travel and Activity Survey, which was a household travel survey collected 
across Oregon from 2009-2011. Sampled households for the Portland metropolitan region were 
surveyed in 2011. All attributes of the survey respondents were removed in this empirical 
application, with the exception of the geographic coordinates of the household location. 
 
The susceptibility of a surveyed household to identity disclosure risk was measured by utilizing 
population data from the 2010 Census at the tract geography. Since the unit of analysis in this 
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particular application was the household unit as opposed to the individual, the field reflecting the 
number of occupied households within a census tract was used. Additionally, information 
pertaining to the land area of a census tract was supplied by the same data source to complete the 
calculation of the estimated k-anonymity statistic. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Three-county study region of Portland metropolitan region 
Data reflecting the built environment, which were used to help quantify the concept of data utility, 
were supplied by several different resources. Two built environment measures classified as density 
calculations were explored in this empirical application: population and employment density. 
Similar to the examination into identity disclosure risk, data used to calculate population density 
were provided by the 2010 Census. Population density was operationalized at both the block group 
geography; thus, depending on the selected scenario for donut size, the repositioned household 
may land within any block group located in the census geography. The variance between the 
population density of the actual household location and geographically perturbed household 
location was found as a component of the PRMSE calculation for data utility. A similar approach 
was used for the other density measure of jobs per acre. Information on this built environment 
measure was supplied by the Census Bureau’s 2010 Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics 
(LEHD) dataset through use of the total number of jobs field within the workplace area 
characteristic subset. Akin to population density, the measure of employment density was 
operationalized at the block group level using land area. For the design built environment measure 
 25 
 
of intersection density, the Census Bureau’s 2010 Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding 
and Referencing (TIGER) dataset was manipulated to count the number of intersections with more 
than three legs per block group. As with the previous two built environment measures, the potential 
to use completely disaggregate measures of intersection density exists with improved 
computational power and data extending across the entire study area. 
 
Two additional built environment variables classified as distance to transit measures were also 
estimated in this empirical application to assess the utility of the geographically perturbed dataset. 
The disaggregate measures of miles to nearest bus stop and distance to nearest rail station were 
calculated by using Metro’s 2010 Regional Land Information System (RLIS) dataset (Metro is 
Portland’s regional government). The ability to use a dataset with a higher resolution for these 
distance measures was due to the fact that all bus stops and rail stations in the three-county region 
are located within Metro’s jurisdiction, which does not extend to the farthest stretches of the chosen 
study area. The distance to the nearest bus stop was a straight-line distance measure from the 
household location to the nearest TriMet bus stop. The distance to the nearest rail station was a 
straight-line distance measure from the household location to the nearest MAX light rail station, 
Portland Streetcar stop, or Westside Express Service (WES) rail station. The difference between 
the number of miles from the original household location to the nearest public transit station and 
the distance from the geographically perturbed household location to the nearest station was used 
when calculating the PRMSE of each household in each scenario. 
 
An examination into the level of disclosure risk and data utility for these five built environment 
measures was conducted for 25 different combinations of inner- and outer-ring radii. In this 
application of the donut masking technique, five different k-anonymity statistics were chosen in 
defining the size of the exclusion area: 25, 50, 100, 250, and 500. For each of these inner-ring 
radii, a complementary outer-ring radius of one-quarter mile, one-half mile, one mile, one and one-
half miles, and two miles was chosen to establish the different donut sizes. Having settled on these 
25 different scenarios, each household in the study area was then spatially perturbed 50 times to 
produce a range of values to be used in quantifying the average risk of disclosure and utility of the 
jittered dataset. A description of the results of this empirical application, which was conducted 
using PostGIS open source software, is provided in the following section. The reader is referred to 
Appendix A for the code used in the application of the donut masking technique. 
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5.0 RESULTS 
This empirical application of the donut masking technique to the spatial location of households 
within the Portland metropolitan region offers an introductory examination into the relationship 
between disclosure risk and data utility in the context of household travel survey data. The use of 
a geographic perturbation method such as the donut masking technique on disaggregate travel 
survey data offers an exciting prospect for researchers who are interested in better understanding 
the complex nature of the links between non-motorized travel and a household’s surrounding built 
environment. Yet, before such household travel survey data may be widely disseminated for public 
consumption, there is an explicit responsibility on behalf of individuals with access to these fine-
scaled data sources to ensure a fitting level of noise is introduced to the dataset in order to preserve 
respondent anonymity. Complementarily, individuals in charge of disseminating these data must 
ensure the level of noise is not so much that researchers utilizing these data for their intended 
applications are led toward inaccurate conclusions. The following section explores these tradeoffs 
between disclosure risk and data utility as well as the important concept of data retention in an 
empirical application of the donut masking technique to households in the Portland metropolitan 
region. 
5.1 DATA RETENTION ANALYSIS 
In the framework of this data masking technique application, data retention refers to the number 
of households that are able to be geographically perturbed in a specific scenario. This opening set 
of analyses is precautious, but mandatory, since the strategy for defining the inner and outer rings 
of the donut area are not directly associated with one another. The decision to set the inner-ring 
radius to a distance equivalent to a k-anonymity statistic defined by the data custodian is not related 
to the selection of a straight-line areal buffer based on common practice for the donut’s outer ring. 
Accordingly, one may imagine a scenario in which a data custodian, who has not given careful 
consideration to the inherent tradeoff between these expressions of disclosure risk and data utility, 
may select a high estimated k-anonymity statistic to define the exclusion area and a constrained 
outer-ring radius to define the boundary of maximum displacement. If the areal buffer defining the 
outer-ring radius is shorter than the inner-ring radius associated with a higher level of anonymity, 
then the result is a collapsed donut in which the actual household location has no geographical 
space to be randomly placed within. The prevalence of the collapsed donut situation in a specific 
scenario must be understood by the data custodian since the households impacted by these 
instances must be spatially perturbed within some other scenario or by another technique. Table 
5-1 shows the number of households within each of the 25 scenarios that were retained in this 
geographic perturbation application, while Table 5-2 provides the percentage of retained records 
out of the sample of 4,824 households. 
 
Table 5-1: Total number of households retained within each scenario 
Estimated 
K-Anonymity 
Outer-Ring Radius in Miles 
0.25 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 
25 4,453 4,650 4,789 4,823 4,823 
50 4,309 4,570 4,772 4,807 4,814 
100 4,142 4,467 4,650 4,772 4,789 
250 3,449 4,286 4,545 4,637 4,743 
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500 1,484 4,010 4,403 4,557 4,637 
 
Table 5-2: Percent of households retained within each scenario 
Estimated 
K-Anonymity 
Outer-Ring Radius in Miles 
0.25 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 
25 92.3% 96.4% 99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 
50 89.3% 94.7% 98.9% 99.6% 99.8% 
100 85.9% 92.6% 96.4% 98.9% 99.3% 
250 71.5% 88.8% 94.2% 96.1% 98.3% 
500 30.8% 83.1% 91.3% 94.5% 96.1% 
 
A review of the above tables confirms the indirect link between the two radii that comprise the 
choice of donut size described in the previous paragraph. Intuitively, an increase in the straight-
line distance of the outer-ring radius within a specified level of k-anonymity resulted in either an 
increase or preservation in the number of households retained in the spatially perturbed datasets. 
A consistent and negative trend was found as the estimated k-anonymity statistic defining the 
inner-ring radius was increased within a specified outer-ring radius. Also of note, even though the 
two scenarios with an estimated k-anonymity statistic of 25 and an outer-ring radius of at least one 
and one-half miles appeared to retain 100 percent of the sampled observations in the altered 
dataset, there was one record in each of these scenarios with a collapsed donut. As such, the data 
custodian must accept either a lower level of data utility or a higher level of disclosure risk when 
geographically perturbing this household location with this version of the donut masking 
technique. 
 
5.1.1 Data Retention within Subcategories of Population Density  
While an examination into the number and percent of households retained within each scenario of 
the geographic perturbation process begins to highlight the sort of tradeoffs that occur when the 
data custodian balances disclosure risk and data utility, this aggregate analysis only scratches the 
surface of how these themes interact with data retention. Understanding that the inner-ring radius 
is directly dependent on the residential density across the survey respondent’s census tract, the 
data custodian may begin to see how a household within a more rural context that is provided a 
high level of anonymity with a small outer-ring radius is more likely to have a collapsed donut 
than a household in an urban context within the same scenario. Accordingly, the data custodian 
may wish to examine how data retention varies across different intensities of built environment 
measures within the same scenario, especially population density. 
 
In order to further inspect data retention trends for the altered datasets across the scenarios, the 
original households were allocated to quintiles based on the population density of the tracts in the 
study area. An equal interval classification scheme of the tracts was favored over a natural breaks 
scheme for this built environment measure since population density can theoretically increase 
without any increase on the same space of land due to intensification in household size or vertical 
growth in residential complexes. While employment density may also be categorized with this 
approach, a natural classification scheme would be more suitable for intersection density or 
distance to nearest transit station since thinking of intensification in these built environment 
measures does not favor the same logic. The distribution of tracts divided into quintiles based on 
population density for the study area is displayed in Figure 5-1. For the quantile classification of 
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population density within the Portland area, 832 households were sampled in the travel survey 
located in a tract classified in the first grouping; 960 households were in the second class; 1,079 
households were in the third class; 982 households were in the fourth class; and 971 households 
were located in those census tracts with the highest population density. 
 
Figure 5-1: Quintile classification of population density for U.S. Census tracts in Portland metropolitan region 
Having defined the classified census tracts across the study area into different contexts based on 
population density, the data custodian may now more closely assess trends in data retention for the 
25 scenarios across five different spatial contexts. Tables 5-3 through 5-7 outline the total number 
and percent of retained households within each scenario, beginning with the first quintile and 
proceeding through the fifth quintile and reflecting the 20 percent of census tracts in the study area 
with the highest population density. 
 
Table 5-3: Number and percent of retained households per scenario within class 1 for population density 
Estimated  
K-
Anonymity 
Outer-Ring Radius in Miles 
0.25 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
25 461 55% 658 79% 797 96% 831 99% 831 99% 
50 317 38% 578 70% 780 94% 815 98% 822 99% 
100 150 18% 475 57% 658 79% 780 94% 797 96% 
250 0 0% 294 35% 553 67% 645 78% 751 90% 
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500 0 0% 30 4% 411 49% 565 68% 645 78% 
 
Table 5-4: Number and percent of retained households per scenario within class 2 for population density 
Estimated  
K-
Anonymity 
Outer-Ring Radius in Miles 
0.25 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
25 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 
50 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 
100 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 
250 417 43% 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 
500 0 0% 948 99% 960 100% 960 100% 960 100% 
 
Table 5-5: Number and percent of retained households per scenario within class 3 for population density 
Estimated  
K-
Anonymity 
Outer-Ring Radius in Miles 
0.25 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
25 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 
50 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 
100 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 
250 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 
500 52 5% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 1,079 100% 
 
Table 5-6: Number and percent of retained households per scenario within class 4 for population density 
Estimated  
K-
Anonymity 
Outer-Ring Radius in Miles 
0.25 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
25 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 
50 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 
100 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 
250 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 
500 470 48% 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 982 100% 
 
Table 5-7: Number and percent of retained households per scenario within class 5 for population density 
Estimated  
K-
Anonymity 
Outer-Ring Radius in Miles 
0.25 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent 
25 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 
50 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 
100 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 
250 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 
500 962 99% 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 971 100% 
 
In total, a glance across the above tables sheds further light on a handful of trends concerning the 
retention of records in an altered dataset, and the application of the donut masking technique with 
intentions for minimum disclosure risk and maximum data utility. An instinctive finding from this 
further parsing of the records was a confirmation of the lone observation in the sample not being 
jittered because of a collapsed donut related to its rural context. The absence of the household from 
this application is revealed in Table 5-3, where 99.9 percent of the households were retained in the 
scenario with the lowest specified k-anonymity statistic and greatest outer-ring radius. By shifting 
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the balance from a scenario maximizing disclosure risk and minimizing data utility to the preferred 
scenario minimizing disclosure risk and maximizing data utility, the results in Table 5-4 exhibit 
the frequency of households in a rural context being susceptible to a collapsed donut in this 
application of the perturbation technique. Households residing in a tract designated in the lowest 
quintile for population density were not able to have their locations spatially perturbed when the 
outer-ring radius was 0.25 miles and the inner-ring radius was defined by a k-anonymity statistic 
of either 250 or 500. Table 5-4 shows that those households located within tracts categorized in 
the second quintile were also not geographically perturbed when the outer-ring radius was 0.25 
miles and the k-anonymity was set at 500. A glance at Table 5-5 shows the percent of retained 
households in this preferred scenario to only slightly increase when located in a tract in the third 
quintile to 4.8 percent; while, retained households remain under 50 percent for this scenario when 
the household resides in a tract marked by the second highest categorization population density 
(Table 5-6). Conditional upon the value of an observation in the survey sample, the data custodian 
may only consider using the scenario with the highest anonymity and potential data utility for those 
households located in the most urban of contexts; however, Table 5-7 shows nine records in this 
particular exploration would still not be retained. 
 
While this analysis of data retention investigated the equal breaks of census tracts in regard to 
population density because of its connection to the size of the exclusion area, a researcher may be 
more interested in other built environment measures. For instance, a data researcher may be 
interested in the association between non-motorized mode choices for work-related purposes and 
employment density. In such applications, the data custodian should consider how levels of data 
retention are distributed across different classifications of the built environment to ensure the 
researcher is provided ample records to conduct the appropriate analysis. Clearly, data retention is 
an essential aspect to consider when releasing disaggregate household travel surveys.  However, 
the theme of disclosure risk will likely carry more weight in the decision of what perturbation 
process is most suitable for publicly releasing a disaggregate dataset. 
5.2 DISCLOSURE RISK ANALYSIS 
To supplement the above examination into data retention, an analysis into the vulnerability of a 
sampled household to identity disclosure was conducted for each of the 25 scenarios. Adhering to 
the aforementioned hierarchical framework for disclosure risk and data utility, the following 
evaluation assesses the potential of a first-tier risk in which the data intruder is able to make a one-
to-one correspondence without the use of external data, local knowledge or analytical effort. As 
such, this disclosure risk analysis is strictly concerned with the level of anonymity introduced to a 
geographically perturbed dataset created by the use of this version of the donut masking technique. 
Moreover, the risk of a household having their identity disclosed is measured through the 
estimation of several k-anonymity statistics derived from 50 geographic perturbations of the 
original household location across 25 combinations of inner- and outer-ring radii. While the 
minimum k-anonymity statistic per scenario is related to the distance of the inner-ring radius and 
the maximum k- anonymity statistic is connected to the outer-ring radius, a proper understanding 
of the mean and median values is less clear and ultimately dependent on the discrepancy between 
distances of the chosen radii. The following analysis will identify trends that arose through a 
general examination of disclosure risk across these scenarios in addition to a detailed assessment 
of anonymity in relation to the grouping of sampled households by the intensity of select built 
environment measures surrounding their location. 
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Table 5-8 shows the average minimum and maximum k-anonymity statistics resulting from 50 
different geographic perturbations of each household surveyed in the three-county study area 
across the 25 different combinations of inner- and outer-ring radii. In those scenarios seeking to 
maximize data utility, the value of the average minimum k-anonymity statistic nearly mirrors the 
absolute minimum value for the statistic, which was specified by the data custodian and used to 
limit the level of identity disclosure. Predictably, as the size of the outside areal buffer increases, 
the gap between the average minimum k-anonymity statistic and value describing the absolute 
minimum k-anonymity statistic for each scenario widens. The greatest difference, 54 households, 
was found to exist when the absolute minimum k-anonymity statistic was 500 and the household 
had the potential to be repositioned two miles from its actual location. Similarly, the value of the 
average maximum k-anonymity statistic for all scenarios shown in Table 5-9 was unsurprisingly 
the greatest in this scenario seeking to minimize disclosure risk at the tradeoff of potentially low 
data utility. 
 
Table 5-8: Average minimum and maximum k-anonymity statistic from 50 simulations per scenario 
Estimated  
K-
Anonymity 
Outer-Ring Radius in Miles 
0.25 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 
Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. 
25 33 451 45 1,680 63 4,860 68 6,689 72 7,499 
50 58 466 71 1,705 89 4,868 94 6,702 97 7,514 
100 107 483 120 1,753 140 5,007 147 6,764 147 7,588 
250 254 548 270 1,826 293 5,137 299 7,016 302 7,715 
500 502 789 518 1,937 544 5,329 551 7,169 554 7,953 
 
Table 5-9: Average median and mean k-anonymity statistic from 50 simulations per scenario 
Estimated  
K-
Anonymity 
Outer-Ring Radius in Miles 
0.25 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean 
25 220 227 668 728 1,445 1,738 1,805 2,237 1,954 2,546 
50 242 249 695 757 1,476 1,766 1,829 2,263 1,988 2,482 
100 277 283 747 807 1,562 1,855 1,907 2,331 2,074 2,559 
250 390 394 880 933 1,740 2,022 2,116 2,539 2,254 2,730 
500 633 638 1,082 1,130 2,027 2,282 2,413 2,804 2,564 3,016 
 
Turning to an evaluation of the average median and mean k-anonymity statistic for the different 
applications of the donut masking technique, the familiar trend of an increase in each measure 
continued in circumstances where either radius was increased and the alternative radius remained 
unchanged. The lowest value for each averaged measure of central tendency was the lowest for 
the scenario with the highest risk of disclosure and lowest potential for spatial error introduction; 
whereas, the scenario with the lowest risk of identity disclosure and highest potential for spatial 
error produced the highest average median and mean k-anonymity statistic of all the scenarios. As 
both of these trends were anticipated, the data custodian may wish to revisit the thought of how 
best to balance these two themes since the researcher will be most interested in maximizing the 
utility of the altered dataset. Accordingly, the data custodian should examine these summary 
statistics for circumstances in which the level of anonymity appears to taper when iteratively 
extending the outer-ring radius. Figure 5-2 provides a bubble chart of the average median k-
anonymity statistic across the 25 scenarios that may help the data custodian visualize any tipping 
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point in the tradeoff between disclosure risk and data utility. A parallel illustration of the average 
mean k-anonymity statistic has not been provided since its portrayal did not offer any additional 
insight beyond those trends in the average median k-anonymity statistic described below. 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Level of anonymity per scenario over 50 simulations (average median k-anonymity) 
A visual inspection of Figure 5-2, which provides bubbles sized relatively to the average median 
k-anonymity statistic for all 25 scenarios, unveils trends regarding the conciliation in potential data 
utility that may be pursued by the data custodian for relatively small increases in respondent 
anonymity. Chiefly, for all anonymity levels analyzed in this empirical application, the extension 
of the outer-ring radius appears to greatly improve the overall average anonymity of participants 
for the smaller outer-ring sizes with this improvement diminishing in magnitude for scenarios with 
an outer-ring radius of at least one mile. On the other hand, the value of the average median k-
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anonymity statistic appears to steadily increase at a slower rate as the outer-ring radius is kept at a 
specified distance and the absolute minimum level of anonymity is increased. Therefore, 
depending on the requisite anonymity level sought by the data custodian and value placed on data 
retention, the data custodian may choose to limit the displacement distance to somewhere between 
1.0-1.5 miles and increase the k-anonymity level to a tolerable threshold. However, this suggestion 
is based on the decision of the data custodian to mask the entire dataset with the same specification 
of inner- and outer-ring radius. The following analyses look at how disclosure risk within each 
scenario is impacted by the grouping of the sampled households’ built environment into different 
classes. 
 
5.2.1 Disclosure Risk within Subcategories of Density Measures  
 
Figure 5-3: Quintile classification of employment density for U.S. Census tracts in Portland metropolitan region 
 
As with the analysis pertaining to data retention, a data custodian may wish to examine whether 
trends found on the aggregate hold when the 25 scenarios are further divided into classifications 
based on certain levels of intensity in the built environment surrounding a sampled household. To 
advance this understanding of disclosure risk in terms of inner- and outer-ring specification, the 
census tracts of the three-county study area were divided into five equal categories based on the 
density measures of persons per acre and jobs per acre. Once the study area was fragmented into 
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these quintiles, the actual location of each sampled household was assigned to one of the five 
classes of the respective built environment measure. Figure 5-1 earlier introduced the spatial layout 
of these quintiles in regard to population density, while Figure 5-3 offers a map of the distribution 
of census tracts defined by the five employment density categories. As with the map classifying 
tracts based on population density, the map describing employment density across the Portland 
region also denotes the values that define membership to each of the quintiles. 
 
Figure 5-4: Level of anonymity per scenario over 50 simulations (quintiles for population density) 
Figure 5-4 is a dot chart plotting the average median k-anonymity statistic for each quintile of 
population density in the 25 different scenarios. This representation of anonymity was estimated 
by finding the median estimated k-anonymity statistic calculated for 50 geographic perturbations 
of each observation in the original dataset and then taking the average of these median values for 
all households located in a tract classified by a particular quintile. Overall, the average anonymity 
continues to increase when the distance of either radius is held constant and the radius of the 
alternative ring is extended. These trends are somewhat intuitive and were noted in the previous 
aggregate analysis; yet, more interesting findings are revealed by examining how average 
anonymity levels change within different contexts of population density. A glance at anonymity 
levels for households located in a rural context noted by the first quintile shows a fairly constant 
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rate of growth when the k-anonymity statistic defining the inner ring is held constant and the outer 
ring is allowed to expand. However, the pattern changes for those households located in tracts with 
a greater population density. The average median k-anonymity values within each group of inner-
ring radii increases at a nonlinear rate, but slows considerably when the outer-ring radius is a 
distance of at least 1.5 miles for households in the most urban context. Moreover, the levels of 
anonymity for those households located outside of the tracts defined by the first class tend to 
converge when the outer ring is set to the two-mile extent. This finding may potentially be due to 
the constraint in this application to define the outer-ring buffer as the tract boundary when the 
displacement distance could potentially place the spatially perturbed household outside of its 
original census tract. In order to see how this constraint may be impacting this analysis of 
disclosure risk, the grouping of the study area by the complementary measure of employment 
density was explored. Figure 5-5 represents a dot chart similar to Figure 5-4, which categorizes 
the built environments of surveyed households by equal intervals of employment density. 
 
Figure 5-5: Level of anonymity per scenario over 50 simulations (quintiles for employment density) 
 
By examining the average level of anonymity for scenarios divided into five employment density 
classes describing the census tract of a survey respondent’s residence, many of the same trends 
 37 
 
noted in the analysis of population density continue to hold. Additionally, the same clustering of 
average median k-anonymity statistic values for the four densest quintiles does not appear when 
looking at the employment density of a census tract; instead, the bunching occurs for households 
located in the middle three quintiles. Of note, the values of the average level of anonymity for the 
quintiles of the five scenarios with an outer ring of one mile in both Figures 5-4 and 5-5 are 
sequential in order. This observed behavior is desirable, especially when examining population 
density, and leads further credence to the notion that the data custodian using this application of 
the donut masking technique may wish to confine any displacement of the household’s location 
by this distance. 
 
5.2.2 Disclosure Risk within Subcategories of Design Measures  
 
Figure 5-6: Natural break classification of intersection density for U.S. Census tracts in Portland metropolitan region 
Building on the previous analyses investigating the degree of disclosure risk characteristic of 
different divisions of the study area by density measures, the following subsection examines the 
average level of anonymity for the various scenarios when categorizing the household’s built 
environment by intersection density. The number of intersections per acre, unlike population or 
employment density, was discretized by using a natural breaks classification scheme since this 
design measure cannot increase on the same space of land. Intersections cannot be placed on top 
of one another like households or jobs can through vertical growth. Figure 5-6 is a map of census 
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tracts in the study area divided into five natural breaks, with the natural break intervals being noted 
in the legend of the figure. In addition to this map outlining the spatial distribution of the different 
levels of intersection density across the region is Figure 5-7, which is a plot of the average median 
k-anonymity statistic for each natural break class of intersection density within the 25 different 
scenarios. 
 
Figure 5-7: Level of anonymity per scenario over 50 simulations (natural breaks for intersection density) 
Many of the trends described in the analyses of different population and employment density 
contexts are also evident in the above illustration of intersection density. Overall, a look at the 
average median anonymity level for scenarios of a comparable outer-ring radius showed that an 
increase in the size of the exclusion area for a scenario led to a heightened level of anonymity. The 
same tendency was evident for the average anonymity of scenarios grouped by an identical 
anonymity constraint for their exclusion area as the outer ring was extended. The lone exception 
to this trend occurring for the scenarios in which the donut masking technique was applied to a 
household was located in those census tracts with the greatest intersection density. Also, the order 
of the natural break classifications of census tracts is sequential for each of those scenarios in 
which the donut masking technique specified an outer-ring radius of one mile or less. This 
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occurrence was also found in the analysis of previous built environment measures with either a 
one-half or one mile outer-ring radius.  
 
5.2.3 Disclosure Risk within Subcategories of Distance to Transit Measures 
While the classification of the previous three built environment measures differed in scheme, the 
trends in the level of disclosure risk found across these varying gradations of a household’s built 
environment were comparable. Such an association is simply the product of each analysis being 
an in-depth extension of the more aggregate analysis described in the beginning of this section. 
However, each of these three extensions into disclosure risk of the 25 scenarios were completed 
by using classifications of the built environment based on area measures, which may have led to 
certain inconsistencies related to how the study area was segmented. To bolster this evaluation of 
disclosure risk, the following subsection provides an assessment of average anonymity levels for 
households in the study region whose locations are categorized based on their accessibility to the 
nearest bus stop and rail station. 
 
Figure 5-8: Manual classification of straight-line distance to nearest bus stop in Portland metropolitan region 
Figure 5-8 is a heat map of the three-county region denoting those areas in which a bus stop may 
be accessed by one of five straight-line distances that also comprise most chosen distances for the 
outer-ring radii in this study. As one may imagine, those areas with the closest proximity to a bus 
stop are centrally located in vicinities with higher population and employment densities. 
 40 
 
Correspondingly, Figure 5-9 reveals those stretches of the Portland metropolitan region that are 
located within varying levels of proximity to a rail station. The heat map denoting the proximity 
to a rail station is more dispersed across the study area with a concentration of areas within one-
quarter mile of a rail station located in downtown Portland. Moreover, a much larger portion of 
the study area is located outside the areal buffer of 1.5 miles from a rail station in comparison to 
the amount of the study area classified as being within the same proximity to a bus stop. These 
differences in the classification of the study area based on distance to nearest bus stop or rail station 
may illuminate additional or establish previously noted trends regarding the level of anonymity 
across different contexts of the 25 applications of the donut masking technique 
 
Figure 5-9: Manual classification of straight-line distance to nearest rail station in Portland metropolitan region 
In the manner of the previous analyses, Figure 5-10 provides a dot chart of the average median k-
anonymity statistic of households for the 25 different scenarios, with the anonymity level being 
divided based on the five manual breaks for the built environment measure of miles to nearest bus 
stop. Figure 5-11 reflects the same dot chart, but for the classification of anonymity level across 
different categories of proximity to the nearest rail station. Using disaggregate distance to transit 
measures for assessing the variation in approximated anonymity levels for different combinations 
of inner- and outer-ring radii cemented those trends identified in prior divisions of the built 
environment. 
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Figure 5-10: Level of anonymity per scenario over 50 simulations (manual breaks for bus stop distance) 
First, the average anonymity level increases across scenarios as either the inner or outer ring is 
extended and the distance of the alternative radius is held constant. Additionally, when only 
bearing in mind those scenarios in this application, disclosure risk is more efficiently minimized 
by increasing the potential displacement distance rather than extending the size of the exclusion 
area. This trend appears to be intrinsic to the chosen methodological approach that defines the 
inner  and outer ring by unrelated strategies. The former radius is identified by a data custodian 
looking to minimize the risk of identity disclosure, and the latter radius is informed by common 
practice in studies on non-motorized travel and the built environment. A second trend confirmed 
from these analyses is the linear rate of increased anonymity associated with those households 
residing in rural contexts in contrast to the non-linear increase in anonymity for those households 
located in more urban contexts that diminishes as the outer ring approaches two miles in radius. 
An assumption that a more urban context is associated with closer proximity to either a bus stop 
or transit station is made here, but this pattern was identified in the analysis of population density 
breaks and is likely attributable to the methodological decision to restrict the perturbed location to 
its original census tract. A third trend, which was disclosed by the use of these disaggregate built 
environment measures classified on a rural-to-urban spectrum, is that an increase in the average 
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anonymity level within each scenario is directly related to an increase in the immediacy of a bus 
stop or rail station to the household location. This trend is intuitive since minimizing the risk of 
identity disclosure for a household location is related to a greater displacement distance. However, 
this hypothesized finding was not clearly evident in the previous analyses utilizing a classification 
of the built environment with more aggregate area measures. Finally, the maximum average 
anonymity achievable for scenarios in this donut masking technique application appears to have 
somewhere around a k-anonymity statistic of 3,000. This anonymity level would seem more than 
adequate in masking the spatial location of a household in most applications of a household survey 
dataset. Furthermore, this threshold for minimizing disclosure risk is likely an artifact of the census 
tract restriction and gives the data custodian an indication of the level of anonymity required for 
the release of the aggregate U.S. Census dataset. 
 
Figure 5-11: Level of anonymity per scenario over 50 simulations (manual breaks for rail station distance) 
5.3 DATA UTILITY ANALYSIS 
The identification of general trends regarding disclosure risk, while a central element for the data 
custodian to evaluate when spatially perturbing a household location, only reflects half of the 
alteration necessary in publicly disseminating a disaggregate data source of use to researchers. The 
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introduction of spatial error is an accepted condition toward ensuring that the confidentiality of the 
respondent’s identity is preserved when preparing any release of household travel survey data at a 
finer resolution. However, at some point, the level of spatial error may become too great for the 
researcher to make any meaningful or assured conclusions from an application of the new dataset. 
As such, the data custodian should give careful deliberation over the choice of inner- and outer-
ring radii for a particular application of the donut masking technique. A choice to generate a large 
exclusion area associated with the decreased ability of a data intruder to make any one-to-one 
correspondence has the added consequence of prohibiting the altered household location of being 
positioned near its original site. Likewise, the extension of the outer-ring radius, which has been 
shown to improve the average anonymity level when holding the inner-ring radius constant, 
permits the geographically perturbed household farther from its true location. The significance of 
either circumstance is that the displacement of a household farther from its actual location has the 
heightened potential to position the jittered household into a built environment setting that is not 
representative of the household’s true setting. On the whole, the greater the disparity between the 
way that these two settings are classified, the less useful the geographically perturbed dataset will 
become to the researcher. 
 
An assessment into the level of disparity found between the built environment of a household’s 
true location and its spatially perturbed site, across different specifications of the donut masking 
technique, is found below. This analysis evaluates the average level of spatial error, quantified as 
PRMSE, for the same five measures of the built environment used in the previous assessment of 
disclosure risk. Beginning with an aggregate calculation of spatial error across all records for a 
given scenario, the following analyses eventually move toward an evaluation of spatial error that 
is based on categorizations of each of these measures of density, design and distance to transit. 
 
Figure 5-12 is a dot chart representing the average level of spatial error introduced in five built 
environment measures for the 25 applications of the donut masking technique. By quantifying the 
concept of data utility with the normalized measure of PRMSE, the data custodian is able to 
compare the spatial error of one built environment measure across different scenarios in addition 
to the arguably more valuable evaluation of the level of spatial error introduced to various built 
environment measures within the same scenario. One obvious trend from this aggregate analysis 
is that an increase in outer-ring radius for the same requirement of anonymity defining the inner-
ring radius produces a greater amount of spatial error in the dataset, no matter what measure of the 
built environment is examined. Similarly, increasing the inner-ring radius, while maintaining the 
same outer-ring radius, introduces more spatial error to the dataset. The detection of these trends 
was predicted and supports the notion that the data custodian must be cognizant of the fact that an 
increase in the potential displacement distance or exclusion area of an application of the donut 
masking technique will lead to lower data utility to the researcher. Moreover, of the two methods 
for changing the donut’s size, the level of spatial error introduction increases at greater rate when 
extending the outer ring from one areal buffer to the next while holding the inner-ring size constant. 
 
A supplement to the identification of aggregate trends based on alterations to the size of either ring 
of the donut is the recognition of what general trends occur within certain built environment 
measures when these various scenarios are explored. One general trend evident from Figure 5-12 
is that when the outer-ring radius is extended at least one mile from the household location, the 
order of built environment measures in relation to their level of spatial error is consistent with the 
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disaggregate measure of distance to the nearest rail station having the least amount of introduced 
error and the aggregate measure of employment density having the largest PRMSE values. Also, 
the order of built environment measures in regard to their spatial error level remains unchanged 
within an outer-ring grouping when the inner-ring radius is determined by a k-anonymity statistic 
of 250 or less. The only scenarios when the order of the built environment measures changes in 
terms of spatial error is when the minimum k-anonymity is increased from 250 to 500 for the one-
quarter and one-half-mile scenarios. In these two instances, the spatial error for distance to the 
nearest rail station surpasses the level of introduced error for the measure of population density. 
As each of these trends assumes the application of a single donut masking technique to the entire 
dataset without regard for different contexts, this analysis would benefit from an extension of this 
analysis that examines spatial error across different classifications of the built environment. 
 
Figure 5-12: Level of spatial error per scenario over 50 simulations (all built environment measures) 
 
5.3.1 Data Utility within Subcategories of Density Measures  
A more sophisticated approach to disseminating a geographically perturbed dataset would take 
into account the balance between both concepts of disclosure risk and data utility as they change 
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across different spatial contexts. For instance, the data custodian may apply one specification of 
the donut masking technique to those households located in a rural context, while deciding to apply 
a more restrictive donut to an urban context where variation in the built environment may be 
greater. Previous analyses looked at tends in anonymity across these different classifications of the 
built environment, which in the long run informs the data custodian of what configurations may 
be ruled out in terms of compromising respondent confidentiality. The following analyses will 
identify trends in spatial error found across the same built environment contexts, which will in turn 
provide the data custodian with a better sense of what scenarios provide less informative data to 
the researcher. Taken together, the understanding of how disclosure risk and data utility vary 
across different landscapes will enable the data custodian to produce a spatially perturbed dataset 
balanced in its consideration of anonymity and spatial error. 
 
Figure 5-13: Level of spatial error per scenario over 50 simulations (quintiles for population density) 
 
Using the same quintiles displayed in Figure 5-1, Figure 5-13 provides an overview of the level of 
spatial error found within different categorizations of population density for the 25 scenarios 
explored in this study. Overall, the geographic perturbation of households located in the lowest 
quintile of population density produces the greatest level of spatial error in those scenarios where 
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the outer-ring radius is at least one mile in distance. Moreover, in each of the scenarios defined by 
an outer-ring radius of at least one mile, the level of spatial error increases as the context of the 
household becomes more rural in nature. A handful of other trends that have parallels with the 
discussion on anonymity were also true in this investigation of data utility. One trend was that the 
rate of increase in PRMSE value was slower in the more urban contexts for scenarios in which the 
inner-ring radius was held constant and the outer-ring radius was allowed to increase. For 
households located in rural contexts, this increase in outer-ring radius for scenarios grouped by a 
comparable inner-ring specification led to a much greater rate of deterioration in the utility of the 
perturbed dataset. Additionally, the introduction of spatial error leveled off for households in the 
densest quintile when the outer-ring radius was at least one mile in distance for a particular 
scenario. 
 
Figure 5-14: Level of spatial error per scenario over 50 simulations (quintiles for employment density) 
Figure 5-14 provides a complementary illustration of how spatial error varies across the different 
groupings of employment density within a given arrangement of inner and outer rings. While in 
many ways this analysis reveals the same trends as the above assessment, this analysis into the 
quintile division of tracts by employment density does reveal one unique trend concerning spatial 
error. For those scenarios where the outer-ring radius was set to be less than one mile in distance, 
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households located in tracts with the lowest level of employment density had the least amount of 
error introduced in spatially perturbing their location. Households residing in tracts characterized 
by the highest level of employment density had the greatest amount of spatial error once their 
location was geographically perturbed. However, for the scenarios in which the outer-ring radius 
was specified to be 1.5 miles or greater, those households in the quintile with the lowest 
employment density now had the greatest amount of spatial error introduced when repositioned, 
while the households located in the tracts with the densest level of employment had the lowest 
PRMSE. The lone exception to this trend is found in the scenario where the inner ring was defined 
by the highest level of disclosure risk and a maximum displacement distance of 1.5 miles. 
Additionally, spatial error introduction increases at a greater rate for those households that are 
located in tracts characterized by a lower employment density. Overall, there is generally less 
variation when a respondent’s household location has been geographically perturbed within a tract 
characterized by high employment density.  
 
5.3.2 Data Utility within Subcategories of Design Measures 
The following subsection examines how data utility varies across different gradations of a third 
areal measure of the built environment, intersection density. Akin to the evaluation of anonymity 
over 25 specifications of the donut masking technique, this operationalization of data utility as 
PRMSE looks at how the repositioning of a household changes the quantification of the concept 
across one of five natural break classifications of the respondent’s census tract. Figure 5-6 earlier 
displayed the distribution of these intersection density classifications of census tracts across the 
three-county study setting. Similar to the density measure for population, many of those tracts 
characterized by the highest level of intersection density are centrally located within Portland. As 
such, households located in census tracts with a higher intersection density can be thought of as 
residing in a more urban context. Understanding how spatial error introduction varies across such 
regional contexts given a certain combination of inner- and outer-ring sizes will help to inform 
what specification a data custodian may select in order to provide the researcher with an altered 
dataset that is useful in its representation of this particular design feature. 
 
A glance at the aggregate patterns across all built environment measures showed that the utility of 
intersection density was better preserved than either population or employment density when the 
household was geographically perturbed. The PRMSE value only exceeded 50 when the inner ring 
was generated with a k-anonymity statistic of 500 and the outer-ring radius extended out to two 
miles from the actual household location. Additionally, the range of PRMSE values within 
scenarios of a given outer-ring radius was relatively small compared to the PRMSE values for 
other density built environment measures. Having established these general trends associated with 
a blanketed look at spatial error introduction for different scenarios, the dot chart of Figure 5-15 
provides additional insight into more nuanced trends in data utility for households residing in tracts 
defined by one of five subcategories of intersection density. 
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Figure 5-15: Level of spatial error per scenario over 50 simulations (natural breaks for intersection density) 
The behavior of this design measure in relation to the amount of spatial error introduced to an 
altered dataset by any specification of the donut masking technique is largely consistent across the 
diverse classifications. For the scenarios with an outer ring of at least one-half mile, the more rural 
the context of the survey respondent and the more spatial error introduced when altering their 
household location. This tendency is only challenged in those two scenarios where the exclusion 
area is defined by an estimated k-anonymity statistic of 250 or 500 and the outer-ring radius is 
only extended one-quarter of a mile from the location of households in the dataset. This finding 
hints at the earlier trend identified in the employment density analysis in which the level of error 
reversed when the configuration of the outer ring of the donut extended beyond one mile, but more 
likely may be related to a circumstance in which the repositioned household is placed within its 
original block group. This would produce no spatial error in this aggregate measure. Furthermore, 
while the range of PRMSE values for intersection density was small relative to other density 
measures when looking at error across an aggregation of landscapes, this closer examination of 
PRMSE reveals that the range of spatial error introduction was much wider for households located 
in census tracts characterized as having less than 0.26 intersections per acre. In fact, those 
households in the most rural context had a PRMSE value greater than 50 for this measure of urban 
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design when allowing their household to be potentially repositioned at least 1.5 miles from its 
original location. 
 
5.3.3 Data Utility within Subcategories of Distance to Transit Measures  
The previous analysis of the level of variation introduced into a dataset by altering the original 
position of a household and measuring the built environment focused on disaggregate measures. 
While this prior analysis of density and design measures was valuable in assessing how the use of 
certain donut masking technique specifications influenced the utility of the altered dataset, there is 
additional insight to be gained through an examination of disaggregate built environment 
measures. One clear benefit from such an evaluation is an understanding that some spatial error is 
introduced to a dataset whenever the original household location has been spatially perturbed. In 
the previous assessment of spatial error introduction pertaining to area-based measures, there was 
the chance that a donut masking technique would reposition a household to a new location without 
any change in the built environment measure. Although such a circumstance could occur when 
evaluating variation based on a single built environment measure, the reason for this lack of error 
in these described instances was due to the aggregate depiction of the built environment. Such a 
representation of the built environment allowed a household to potentially be repositioned within 
its home census block group. When this event occurred during any of the 50 simulations of a 
household for a particular scenario, the relative error in the built environment was measured as 
zero. Given the geographic size of block groups is larger for those administrative units located in 
less populated areas, the aggregate nature of these measures may have led to situations where the 
use of a restricted donut in perturbing the location of households in this context has small PRMSE 
values. For this reason, an evaluation of data utility for a disaggregate built environment measure 
across various classifications of the study area is a necessary exercise. Furthermore, the 
understanding of how built environment measures with a higher resolution are influenced by the 
implementation of different scenarios of the donut masking technique is paramount in avoiding 
any ecological fallacy in examining the relationship between non-motorized travel and the built 
environment. 
 
The two disaggregate built environment measures used in this analysis of the utility of an altered 
dataset are the distance to the nearest bus stop and distance to the nearest rail station. Figure 5-16 
provides a dot chart reflecting the level of spatial error per scenario for the accessibility measure 
of distance to nearest bus stop across five classifications for proximity informed by the literature.  
A trend evident from this visualization is that the order of the classifications is not successive in 
any of the scenarios. While the PRMSE values associated with households residing farther than 
1.5 miles from the nearest bus stop are the lowest in each scenario, there may be some surprise in 
the finding that PRMSE values for the fourth classification, and not the fifth, are the greatest in 
each application of the donut masking technique with an outer ring of at least one-half mile. In 
four of the five scenarios where the outer-ring radius is one-quarter of a mile in length, the order 
of classifications was sequential with those households located closest to a bus stop having the 
most variation introduced to the dataset when spatially repositioning their residence. Another trend 
in regard to the data utility of this distance to transit measure was that the PRMSE values for 
households located within one-half mile straight-line distance from a bus stop were fairly stable 
for those scenarios in which the maximum potential displacement distance was at least one mile. 
This latter finding is likely related to the joint influence of the methodological approach 
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constraining the repositioned household to remain within its original tract and the nature of the 
built environment measure being a straight-line calculation connecting two points on a map. 
 
Figure 5-16: Level of spatial error per scenario over 50 simulations (manual breaks for bus stop distance) 
This link between the use of a straight-line calculation for a distance to transit measure and the 
application of the donut masking technique becomes clearer when looking at the distribution of 
PRMSE values for the manual classifications of the miles to nearest rail station measure. Figure 
5-17 provides the familiar dot chart of introduced spatial error values per classification for this 
disaggregate measure of the built environment across the 25 different configurations of the donut 
masking technique. Expectedly, there was little change in the level of spatial error introduced to 
the altered dataset resulting from an increased level of anonymity defining the exclusion area. In 
fact, the spacing of PRMSE values between the categories in the specification resulting in the 
smallest inner-ring radius and largest outer-ring radius were fairly uniform. In contrast, the gaps 
in PRMSE values for the scenario defined by the largest k-anonymity statistic and smallest outer-
ring distance were clustered when the households were originally located less than one mile from 
the nearest rail station. Overall, the behavior of this particular disaggregate distance to transit 
measures is well understood with the outcome of introduced spatial error in the altered dataset 
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ultimately dependent upon the specification of the donut masking technique designated by the data 
custodian. 
 
Figure 5-17: Level of spatial error per scenario over 50 simulations (manual breaks for rail station distance) 
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6.0 DISCUSSION 
This exploration of an innovative technique to spatially perturb the residences of respondents to a 
household travel survey in the Portland metropolitan region has unveiled a number of common 
themes regarding disclosure risk, data utility and data retention. The concept of disclosure risk 
examined in this study denotes the ability of a data intruder to make a one-to-one correspondence 
between the location of the geographically perturbed household and their actual residence with 
relatively little effort and without any additional data sources or external knowledge of the survey 
respondent. An evaluation of this concept was undertaken through the estimation of a k-anonymity 
statistic found in the information sciences, and was operationalized in this technique by the 
creation of an exclusion area in which the perturbed household cannot be geographically 
repositioned. The complementary concept of data utility refers to the introduction of spatial error 
to a dataset that occurs when the location of household respondents have been altered through the 
implementation of the donut masking technique. Data utility was assessed by measuring the 
PRMSE of five built environment measures as they relate to the actual and perturbed household 
locations. This calculation of spatial error introduction was strongly connected to the selection of 
outer-ring radius distances, which was largely contingent on areal buffers commonly studied in 
research on the links between non-motorized travel and the built environment. The balancing of 
this preservation of data utility and minimization of disclosure risk is ultimately determined by the 
choice of inner and outer rings, which will in turn advise the data custodian of the degree of records 
that can be retained by the chosen specification. Collectively, these themes are central to the public 
dissemination of these disaggregate data and help to inform the data custodian in her choice of a 
suitable specification of the donut masking technique, which both protects the confidentiality 
pledge with the survey respondent and maintains the utility of the dataset to the researcher. 
An improved understanding of the interconnected nature of these three concepts was established 
through an empirical application of the donut masking technique with 25 unique specifications. 
The themes collected from this analysis offer several rules of thumb to be considered in any future 
application of this geographic perturbation technique as well as a number of thoughts that may 
guide future extensions of this research. The following chapter describes several of these 
guidelines in addition to noting some limitations and potential future expansions of this research. 
6.1 GENERAL RULES OF THUMB FOR FUTURE APPLICATION 
Having conducted an empirical application of the donut masking techniques using household 
travel survey data from the Portland metropolitan area, several trends were uncovered regarding 
the interplay between data retention, disclosure risk and data utility. The choice of specification 
for the application of this geographic perturbation technique had repercussions for each of these 
themes that, when taken together, provide some insight for any future application. The following 
bulleted points outline some general rules of thumb that may be taken away from this effort. 
 
 The ideal balance of minimum disclosure risk and maximum data utility should only be sought 
after in the most urban of contexts, as the configuration of such a donut for a less densely 
populated area will result in the significant loss of sampled observations. 
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 For the greatest improvement in average levels of anonymity, the maximum displacement 
distance should be extended; however, the return on such an extension is less beneficial to a 
household in an urban context after one mile. 
 An improvement in the utility of the dataset with regard to employment density of the 
respondent’s census block group should be sought since this built environment measure was most 
impacted by the geographic perturbation of the actual household location. 
 When seeking to maximize the utility of density measures of the built environment, the data 
custodian should be cognizant that the specification of a scenario with a maximum displacement 
distance over one mile may introduce excessive error in rural contexts. 
 To provide an altered dataset giving adequate attention to both concepts of disclosure risk and 
data utility, the single specification of a donut masking technique to all respondents in the dataset 
should be avoided by a data custodian. 
 
While many of these points are an artifact of this specific implementation of the donut masking 
technique, they do help to establish some clear starting points for any potential future expansion. 
Of course, being that the points are rough guidelines related to this particular application, any 
extension of this work should not completely rest upon these suggestions. 
6.2 LIMITATIONS AND POTENTIAL FUTURE EXPANSIONS 
This study has shown the promise of the donut masking technique in negotiating the balance 
between disclosure risk and data utility that is central to the distribution of a household travel 
survey dataset with heightened spatial resolution. Nevertheless, the exploratory nature of this 
application of a new geographic perturbation technique has both provided valuable insight to 
researchers and raised questions to be addressed by any future expansion of this donut masking 
technique. The limitations of this empirical application are related to the selected methodological 
approach, which were difficult to foresee prior to implementation due to the innovative nature of 
this research, in addition to the defined scope of work. The scope strictly focused on the prevention 
of a first-tier breach in the confidentiality pledge between the survey respondent and collector of 
the survey data. Moreover, there exist plenty of broader themes concerning the complete release 
of a disaggregate data source for public consumption that warrant contemplation by the travel 
survey community. While in no way an exhaustive list, some of these themes are also identified in 
the following discussion. 
 
In relation to the methodology selected for this application, there was a necessity in recognizing 
the number of records preserved by the specification of the donut masking technique due to the 
lack of interdependency between the inner- and outer-ring radii. In this application, the distance of 
the inner-ring radius for each household is dependent on the level of anonymity desired by the data 
custodian. Thus, the exclusion area’s size is tied to the residential density of the household’s census 
tract, where households located in urban contexts have a minimum displacement distance that is 
smaller than their rural counterparts. A household in a densely populated census tract does not 
have to be repositioned as far as a household in a sparsely populated tract in order to provide the 
same estimated k-anonymity statistic. On the other hand, the selection of an outer-ring radius was 
a manual specification of distance that was informed by practices common to the literature. 
Accordingly, there were certain scenarios in which a higher level of anonymity required some 
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households to be relocated a distance greater than the maximum displacement distance defined. 
This circumstance resulted in the failure to reposition a household within any geographic space 
due to the collapsing of the donut. In these instances, the data custodian must consider the value 
of retaining these records in the altered dataset and proceed accordingly. 
 
Another methodological limitation to be addressed in future applications relates to the restriction 
of the household to their original census tract. This constraint is related to the use of residential 
density at the census tract geography in estimating the k-anonymity statistic. There is the potential 
for future expansions to use disaggregate household positions in calculating this measure of 
disclosure risk that would not confine the repositioned household to this administrative boundary, 
which could subsequently help the retention of data records since the outer-ring perimeter would 
often be extended in those scenarios with a greater maximum displacement distance. Related to 
this request for a disaggregate measure of household location, which was not pursued because of 
computational burden and lack of study area coverage in such a data source, is the exploration of 
data utility using additional built environment measures with improved resolution. In this study, 
the only truly disaggregate data were classified as distance to transit measures. Future expansions 
should examine the relationship between different scenarios and the utility of a count or density 
measure that is not aggregated to the census block group. Such measures have the potential to be 
more informative in studies on non-motorized travel as they will address ecological fallacy 
concerns that have clouded many past research efforts. 
 
In addition to these methodological limitations, there were a number of directions that should be 
explored by future geographic perturbation applications. For instance, the scope of this study was 
restricted to the understanding of how the geographic perturbation of household locations relates 
to the reduction in first-tier disclosure risk. While the importance of lessening the likelihood of 
this highest breach in respondent confidentiality was explored in this application, a thorough 
examination of disclosure risk must also reduce the prospect of any second- or third-tier breach. 
The spatial perturbation of activity locations, which would also diminish the utility of a dataset, 
must also be considered by a data custodian in order to publicly disseminate these valuable data. 
Information regarding a household member’s employment location may provide the additional 
piece of knowledge required of a data intruder to make a one-to-one correspondence. Thus, the 
data custodian must spatially perturb the activity location in addition to their residence so as to 
preserve survey respondent anonymity within the disaggregate dataset. Furthermore, additional 
consideration may be given by the data custodian to provide further practicality to the altered 
dataset by only allowing the randomly perturbed household or activity location to be placed in a 
corresponding zoning district. In addition to this constraint of land use preservation, which may 
help to limit the introduction of spatial error in regard to the built environment, is the notion of 
data swapping. The random spatial repositioning of a household unit has the potential to place the 
geographically perturbed location on the site of another household unit, raising concerns regarding 
the misidentification of one household and their attributes as another household in the release of 
an altered dataset. 
 
This last illustration reflects one of the many challenges of using the donut masking technique as 
a post-processing strategy used for publicly releasing these disaggregate data. As travel survey 
data collection methods continue to move away from traditional approaches and toward real-time 
strategies, there is an increased requirement on the behalf of the data custodian to assure survey 
 56 
 
respondents that their data remain confidential. This instillation of confidence in the respondent 
becomes more difficult as the data custodian begins to consider the external knowledge of data 
intruders or the resources available to them. In the past, a sunset period has been assumed to exist 
on such data as household and travel attributes are assumed to change over a given period of time. 
However, the increased ability to spread household travel data almost instantaneously because of 
technological advancement has forced participants in the data collection process to consider the 
true risk of disseminating these data. Obviously, a greater discussion concerning the proper level 
of anonymity must be given further thought by the profession. This exploration has looked to 
advance such deliberation through the empirical application of a spatial perturbation technique 
aimed at examining the inherent tradeoff between disclosure risk and data utility when seeking to 
disseminate disaggregate household travel survey data. 
. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: DONUT MASKING TECHNIQUE POSTGIS CODE 
README 
Requirements:  
Postgres 9.2 with PostGIS 
 
Order of code to be run, plus brief description. 
1. jitter_load_data.sql 
   Executed by user. 
   Loads shapefiles into postgres tables, converts everything to common spatial reference. 
2. jitter_setupfunctions.sql 
    Executed by user 
    Two purposes:  
     - creates postgres functions that do the work. 
     - calls the functions to do the work of generating jittered scenario points.  
    Loads the following files as functions.  
2.a create_function_jittery_calculate_inner_radius.sql 
 Imported by jitter_setupfunctions.sql 
 Calculates the inner-radius diameter based on HH counts.  
2.b create_function_jittery_make_donuts.sql 
 Imported by jitter_setupfunctions.sql 
 Creates  donut shaped geometry  
2.c create_function_jittery_random_point_nulls_handled.sql 
    Imported by jitter_setupfunctions.sql 
 Generates random points 
2.d.i create_function_jittery_boston_nearest_neighbor.sql 
2.d.ii create_function_jittery_boston_call_nn.sql 
2.d.iii create_function_jittery_boston_expand.sql 
2.d.iv create_function_jittery_get_nn_to_sample_or_iteration.sql 
    Imported by jitter_setupfunctions.sql 
 Finds the nearest neighbor point between two sets  
2.e create_function_jittery_generate_scenarios_and_counts.sql 
    Imported by jitter_setupfunctions.sql 
 Main function that executes the work of generating scenarios & counts.  
2.f create_function_jittery_median.sql 
    Imported by jitter_setupfunctions.sql 
    Generates a median from a list of numbers.  
3. runit.sh 
   Executed by user (unix environment only) 
   Exports the scenario data.  
3.a template_export.sql 
    Helper script used in runit.sh 
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jitter_load_data.sql 
create schema jittery; 
-- These data are in feet 
/Applications/Postgres.app/Contents/MacOS/bin/./shp2pgsql -c -D -s 2913 -I 
data_to_import/BE_Intersection jittery.be_i | psql -d omc -h localhost 
/Applications/Postgres.app/Contents/MacOS/bin/./shp2pgsql -c -D -s 2913 -I 
data_to_import/Geography_BlockGroup jittery.geo_bg | psql -d omc -h localhost 
/Applications/Postgres.app/Contents/MacOS/bin/./shp2pgsql -c -D -s 2913 -I 
data_to_import/Geography_Tract jittery.geo_tr | psql -d omc -h localhost 
/Applications/Postgres.app/Contents/MacOS/bin/./shp2pgsql -c -D -s 2913 -I 
data_to_import/OHAS_Household jittery.ohas | psql -d omc -h localhost 
--These data are in utm 
/Applications/Postgres.app/Contents/MacOS/bin/./shp2pgsql -c -s 3157:2913 -I 
data_to_import/BE_TransitRail jittery.be_r | psql -d omc -h localhost 
/Applications/Postgres.app/Contents/MacOS/bin/./shp2pgsql -c -s 3157:2913 -I 
data_to_import/BE_TransitBus jittery.be_b| psql -d omc -h localhost 
/Applications/Postgres.app/Contents/MacOS/bin/./shp2pgsql -c -s 3157:2913 -I 
data_to_import/intersection_density jittery.int_dens | psql -d omc -h localhost 
 
jitter_setupfunctions.sql 
-- Set up the schema for the functions to live 
drop schema if exists jit_functions CASCADE; 
create schema jit_functions; 
-- Type is used in the function: create_function_jittery_boston_call_nn.sql  
-- If need to alter name or location, make sure that function is updated.  
DROP TYPE IF EXISTS pgis_nn;  
CREATE TYPE pgis_nn AS 
   (gid integer, dist numeric(12,5)); 
--import the functions    
\i create_function_jittery_calculate_inner_radius.sql 
\i create_function_jittery_make_donuts.sql 
\i create_function_jittery_random_point_nulls_handled.sql 
\i create_function_jittery_boston_nearest_neighbor.sql 
\i create_function_jittery_boston_call_nn.sql 
\i create_function_jittery_boston_expand.sql 
\i create_function_jittery_generate_scenarios_and_counts.sql 
\i create_function_jittery_get_nn_to_sample_or_iteration.sql 
\i create_function_jittery_median.sql 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 26, 1320, 'k_25_qtrmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 51, 1320, 'k_50_qtrmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 101, 1320, 'k_100_qtrmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 251, 1320, 'k_250_qtrmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 501, 1320, 'k_500_qtrmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 26, 2640, 'k_25_halfmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 51, 2640, 'k_50_halfmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 101, 2640, 'k_100_halfmi'); 
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select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 251, 2640, 'k_250_halfmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 501, 2640, 'k_500_halfmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 26, 5280, 'k_25_onemi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 51, 5280, 'k_50_onemi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 101, 5280, 'k_100_onemi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 251, 5280, 'k_250_onemi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 501, 5280, 'k_500_onemi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 26, 7920, 'k_25_threehalfmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 51, 7920, 'k_50_threehalfmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 101, 7920, 'k_100_threehalfmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 251, 7920, 'k_250_threehalfmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 501, 7920, 'k_500_threehalfmi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 26, 10560, 'k_25_twomi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 51, 10560, 'k_50_twomi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 101, 10560, 'k_100_twomi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 251, 10560, 'k_250_twomi'); 
select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 501, 10560, 'k_500_twomi'); 
 
create_function_jittery_calculate_inner_radius.sql 
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION jit_functions.calculate_inner_radius ( 
  tract_area double precision, 
  kstat double precision, 
  household_count double precision 
 ) 
 RETURNS double precision 
 AS $$ 
DECLARE 
  calcValue double precision; 
BEGIN 
 --calcValue = sqrt(tract_area/pi()*kstat/household_count)*1609.344; -- this was using meters, 
will use feet instead.  
 calcValue = sqrt((tract_area/pi())*(kstat/household_count))*5280;  
 RETURN calcValue; 
END;  
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql; 
 
create_function_jittery_make_donuts.sql 
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION jit_functions.make_donuts ( 
  input_schema text, 
  ohas_points text, 
  k_stat double precision, 
  outer_radius double precision, 
  output_schema text,  
  debug boolean DEFAULT FALSE 
 ) 
 RETURNS Boolean 
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 AS $$ 
DECLARE 
  to_execute text; 
  function_schema text:= 'jit_functions'; 
BEGIN 
-- Create the table to hold inner-radius calculations 
to_execute = 'DROP TABLE IF EXISTS ' || output_schema || '.inner_radius'; 
IF debug THEN  
 RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
END IF; 
EXECUTE to_execute;  
to_execute = 'CREATE TABLE '||  output_schema || '.inner_buf_radius AS 
    SELECT '|| function_schema || '.calculate_inner_radius(AREA_NOH2O, ' || k_stat || ', 
HU10_OCC) as inner_radius, 
    geo_tr.gid as geo_tr_id, 
    ohas.sampn as sampn 
    FROM ' || input_schema || '.ohas 
    JOIN ' || input_schema || '.geo_tr ON ST_Contains(geo_tr.geom, ohas.geom)'; 
IF debug THEN  
 RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
END IF; 
EXECUTE to_execute;  
-- Creating a table of the inner & outer ring geometry of each point.  
to_execute =  'DROP TABLE IF EXISTS ' || output_schema || '.rings'; 
IF debug THEN  
 RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
END IF; 
EXECUTE to_execute; 
to_execute = 'CREATE TABLE ' || output_schema || '.rings AS 
    SELECT ST_Buffer(ohas.geom, buff.inner_radius) as inner_ring, 
    ST_Buffer(ohas.geom, '|| outer_radius ||') as outer_ring, 
    ohas.sampn as sampn 
    FROM '|| input_schema || '.ohas 
    JOIN ' || output_schema || '.inner_buf_radius as buff on (ohas.sampn = buff.sampn)';  
IF debug THEN  
 RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
END IF; 
EXECUTE to_execute; 
-- Clip the inner rings from the outer rings. 
--Create a table of the "ring" geometry for each point.  
to_execute =  'DROP TABLE IF EXISTS ' || output_schema || '.donuts'; 
IF debug THEN  
 RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
END IF; 
EXECUTE to_execute; 
to_execute = 'CREATE TABLE ' || output_schema || '.donuts AS 
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    SELECT ST_Difference(rings.outer_ring, rings.inner_ring) as donut, 
    rings.sampn 
    from '|| output_schema ||'.rings';  
IF debug THEN  
 RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
END IF; 
EXECUTE to_execute; 
-- Clip the donuts to the tracts 
to_execute =  'DROP TABLE IF EXISTS ' || output_schema || '.donuts_clipped'; 
IF debug THEN  
 RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
END IF; 
EXECUTE to_execute; 
to_execute = 'CREATE TABLE ' || output_schema || '.donuts_clipped AS 
    SELECT ST_Intersection(donuts.donut, geo_tr.geom) as geom, donuts.sampn, b.geo_tr_id  
    FROM '|| output_schema ||'.donuts 
    JOIN '|| output_schema ||'.inner_buf_radius b on (donuts.sampn = b.sampn) 
    JOIN '|| input_schema ||'.geo_tr on (b.geo_tr_id  = geo_tr.gid)'; 
IF debug THEN  
 RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
END IF; 
EXECUTE to_execute;  
RETURN TRUE; 
END;  
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql; 
 
create_function_jittery_random_point_nulls_handled.sql 
--ALMOST Courtesy of http://sorokine.blogspot.com/2011/05/postgis-function-for-random-
point.html 
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION jit_functions.random_point_nulls_handled ( 
  geom Geometry 
  --OUT rpoint Geometry, 
  --OUT about_rpoint varchar(10) 
 ) 
 RETURNS Geometry 
 AS $$ 
DECLARE 
 i INTEGER := 0; 
 x0 DOUBLE PRECISION; 
 dx DOUBLE PRECISION; 
 y0 DOUBLE PRECISION; 
 dy DOUBLE PRECISION; 
 xp DOUBLE PRECISION; 
 yp DOUBLE PRECISION; 
 rpoint Geometry := NULL; 
 geom_2d Geometry := NULL; 
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 maxiter int := 5000; 
 about_rpoint varchar(10) := 'UNKNOWN'; 
 BEGIN 
 IF ST_IsEmpty(geom::geometry) <> 't' THEN 
   geom_2d = ST_GeomFromEWKB(geom); 
     --RAISE INFO '2ND HERE %', geom; 
    -- find envelope 
    x0 = ST_XMin(geom_2d); 
    dx = (ST_XMax(geom_2d) - x0); 
    y0 = ST_YMin(geom_2d); 
    dy = (ST_YMax(geom_2d) - y0); 
      WHILE i < maxiter LOOP 
      i = i + 1; 
     xp = x0 + dx * random(); 
     yp = y0 + dy * random(); 
     rpoint = ST_SetSRID( ST_MakePoint( xp, yp ), ST_SRID(geom_2d) ); 
     EXIT WHEN ST_Within( rpoint, geom_2d ); 
     --RAISE INFO 'SECOND HERE with %, %, %, %, %, %', i, rpoint, x0, dx, xp, geom_2d; 
    END LOOP; 
 ELSE 
    about_rpoint := 'EMPTY-POLY'; 
  END IF;  
 IF i >= maxiter THEN 
    --RAISE INFO 'RandomPoint: number of interations exceeded ', maxiter; 
    -- force the point to be st_pointonsurface so that it doesn't land outside the clipped donut.  
    rpoint = st_pointonsurface(geom_2d); 
    about_rpoint := '2MANY-ITER'; 
 END IF;  
 RETURN rpoint; 
END;  
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql; 
 
create_function_jittery_boston_nearest_neighbor.sql 
-- With some implementation tweaks, basic function courtesy of 
http://www.bostongis.com/blog/index.php?/categories/7-nearest-neighbor 
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION jit_functions.pgis_fn_nn( 
 geom1 geometry,  
 distguess double precision,  
 numnn integer,  
 maxslices integer,  
 lookupset varchar(150),  
 swhere varchar(5000),  
 sgid2field varchar(100),  
 sgeom2field varchar(100)) 
  RETURNS SETOF pgis_nn AS 
$BODY$ 
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DECLARE 
    strsql text; 
    rec pgis_nn; 
    ncollected integer; 
    it integer; 
--NOTE: it: the iteration we are currently at  
--start at the bounding box of the object (expand 0) and move up until it has collected more objects 
than we need or it = maxslices whichever event happens first 
BEGIN 
    ncollected := 0; it := 0; 
    WHILE ncollected < numnn AND it <= maxslices LOOP 
        strsql := 'SELECT currentit.' || sgid2field || ', st_distance(ref.geom, currentit.' || sgeom2field || 
') as dist 
        FROM ' || lookupset || '  as currentit, (SELECT geometry(''' || CAST(geom1 As text) || ''') As 
geom) As ref 
        WHERE ' ||swhere || ' AND ST_Expand(ref.geom, ' || CAST(distguess*it/maxslices As 
varchar(100)) ||  ') && currentit.geom 
        AND jit_functions.expandoverlap_metric(ref.geom, currentit.geom, ' || CAST(distguess As 
varchar(200)) || ', ' || CAST(maxslices As varchar(200)) || ') = ' || CAST(it As varchar(100)) || ' 
        ORDER BY st_distance(ref.geom, currentit.geom) LIMIT ' || CAST((numnn - ncollected) As 
varchar(200)); 
        --RAISE NOTICE 'sql: %', strsql; 
        --RAISE NOTICE 'it: %', it; 
        --RAISE NOTICE 'ncollected: %', ncollected; 
                --RAISE NOTICE 'ncollected: %', ncollected; 
        -- I put this in  
        if strsql is null THEN 
            EXIT; 
        end if;      
        FOR rec in EXECUTE (strsql) LOOP 
            IF ncollected < numnn THEN 
                ncollected := ncollected + 1; 
                RETURN NEXT rec; 
            ELSE 
                EXIT; 
            END IF; 
        END LOOP; 
        it := it + 1; 
    END LOOP; 
END 
$BODY$ 
LANGUAGE 'plpgsql' STABLE; 
 
create_function_jittery_boston_call_nn.sql 
-- With some implementation tweaks, basic function courtesy of 
http://www.bostongis.com/blog/index.php?/categories/7-nearest-neighbor 
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION jit_functions.call_pgis_fn_nn( 
 geom1 geometry,  
 distguess double precision,  
 numnn integer,  
 maxslices integer,  
 lookupset varchar(150),  
 swhere varchar(5000),  
 sgid2field varchar(100),  
 sgeom2field varchar(100)) 
  RETURNS SETOF pgis_nn AS 
$BODY$ 
    SELECT * FROM jit_functions.pgis_fn_nn($1,$2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8); 
$BODY$ 
  LANGUAGE 'sql' STABLE; 
 
create_function_jittery_boston_expand.sql 
-- With some implementation tweaks, basic function courtesy of 
http://www.bostongis.com/blog/index.php?/categories/7-nearest-neighbor 
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION jit_functions.expandoverlap_metric( 
 a geometry,  
 b geometry,  
 maxe double precision,  
 maxslice double precision) 
  RETURNS integer AS 
$BODY$ 
BEGIN 
    FOR i IN 0..maxslice LOOP 
        IF st_expand(a,maxe*i/maxslice) && b THEN 
            RETURN i; 
        END IF; 
    END LOOP;  
    RETURN 99999999; 
END; 
$BODY$ 
LANGUAGE 'plpgsql' IMMUTABLE; 
 
create_function_jittery_get_nn_to_sample_or_iteration.sql 
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION jit_functions.get_nn_to_sample_or_iteration ( 
  input_schema text, 
  output_schema text, 
  input_points_table_name text, 
  nn_points_table_name text, 
  output_table_name text, 
  is_iteration boolean, 
  max_nn_dist_expected double precision DEFAULT 200000, 
  maxslices integer DEFAULT  100,  
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  debug boolean DEFAULT FALSE 
 ) 
 RETURNS Boolean 
 AS $$ 
-- Inputs points should be OHAS or one of the iteration sets of points.  
DECLARE 
  to_execute text; 
  function_schema text:= 'jit_functions'; 
  nn_points_id_field text := 'gid'; 
BEGIN 
to_execute = 'DROP TABLE IF EXISTS ' ||output_schema || '.' || output_table_name; 
IF debug THEN  
 RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
END IF; 
EXECUTE to_execute;   
IF is_iteration THEN 
   to_execute = 'CREATE TABLE ' ||output_schema || '.' || output_table_name ||' AS 
       SELECT pts.sampn as sampn, 
       pts.iter_num as iter_num, 
       (jit_functions.call_pgis_fn_nn( 
       pts.geom,' --geom1 geometry,  
       || max_nn_dist_expected ||', '||--distguess double precision, 
       '1, '|| --numnn integer,' 
        maxslices ||', ' ||--maxslices integer, 
       ''''|| input_schema || '.' || nn_points_table_name||''', '||--lookupset varchar(150), 
       '''true'', '||--swhere varchar(5000), 
       '''gid'', '||--sgid2field varchar(100), 
       '''geom''' ||-- sgeom2field varchar(100) 
       ')).* FROM '|| output_schema ||'.'||input_points_table_name || ' pts'; 
ELSE  
   to_execute = 'CREATE TABLE ' ||output_schema || '.' || output_table_name ||' AS 
       SELECT pts.sampn as sampn, 
       (jit_functions.call_pgis_fn_nn( 
       pts.geom,' --geom1 geometry,  
       || max_nn_dist_expected ||','|| --distguess double precision, 
       '1, '|| --numnn integer,' 
        maxslices ||', '||--maxslices integer, 
       '''' ||input_schema || '.' || nn_points_table_name||''', '|| --lookupset varchar(150), 
       '''true'', '||--swhere varchar(5000), 
       '''gid'', ' ||--sgid2field varchar(100), 
       '''geom''' || -- sgeom2field varchar(100) 
       ')).* FROM '|| input_schema ||'.'||input_points_table_name || ' pts'; 
END IF; 
IF debug THEN  
 RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
END IF; 
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EXECUTE to_execute;  
RETURN TRUE; 
END;  
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql; 
 
create_function_jittery_generate_scenarios_and_counts.sql 
--Test case run:  
-- select jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts('jittery', 51, 1620, 'tmp_8'); 
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION jit_functions.generate_scenarios_and_counts ( 
  input_schema text, 
  k_stat double precision, 
  outer_radius double precision, 
  output_schema text 
 ) 
 RETURNS Boolean 
 AS $$ 
DECLARE 
  to_execute text; 
  function_schema text:= 'jit_functions'; 
  data_schema text:= 'jittery'; 
  num_scenarios integer:= 50; 
BEGIN 
-- 0. PREP SCHEMA 
to_execute = 'DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS ' ||output_schema || ' CASCADE'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;   
to_execute = 'CREATE SCHEMA ' ||output_schema ; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;   
to_execute = 'CREATE TABLE ' ||output_schema || '.iteration_rows AS SELECT generate_series 
as iter_num FROM generate_series(1, '|| num_scenarios || ')' ; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;   
-- 1. MAKE DONUTS  
to_execute =  
 'SELECT ' || function_schema || '.make_donuts (''' || input_schema || ''', ''ohas'', '|| k_stat || ', 
' || outer_radius ||', ''' || output_schema ||''')'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;   
-- 2. GENERATE SCENARIO POINTS 
-- 2.a Create the points themselves 
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE ' || output_schema|| '.iteration_points AS SELECT ' || function_schema 
|| '.random_point_nulls_handled(dc.geom) as geom, dc.sampn, dc.geo_tr_id, i.iter_num FROM '|| 
output_schema || '.donuts_clipped dc, ' || output_schema || '.iteration_rows i'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
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EXECUTE to_execute;   
-- 2.b Append to points the basic info about it's error & where it came from:    
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE ' || output_schema || '.iteration_points_estkanon as SELECT ip.geom, 
ip.sampn, ip.iter_num, st_x(ip.geom) as xcoord_1, st_y(ip.geom) as ycoord_1, blocks.tract10 as 
tract_1, blocks.blkgrp10 as group_1, pi()*((ST_Distance(ip.geom, 
op.geom)/5280)^2)*(tracts.HU10_OCC/tracts.area_noh2o) as est_kanon FROM ' || 
output_schema || '.iteration_points ip  JOIN ' || input_schema || '.geo_bg blocks on st_intersects 
(ip.geom, blocks.geom) JOIN ' || input_schema || '.geo_tr tracts  on (blocks.tract10 = tracts.tract10) 
JOIN ' || input_schema || '.ohas op on (ip.sampn = op.sampn)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;       
-- 3. GET STATS ONTO THE OHAS & SCENARIO POINTS 
-- 3.a.i  Rail onto the OHAS points   
to_execute =  
 'SELECT ' || function_schema || '.get_nn_to_sample_or_iteration(''' || input_schema ||  
 ''',''' || output_schema || ''',''ohas'', ''be_r'', ''ohas_transit_rail_closest'', false)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;   
-- 3.a.ii  Rail onto the iteration points   
to_execute =  
 'SELECT ' || function_schema || '.get_nn_to_sample_or_iteration(''' || input_schema ||  
 ''',''' || output_schema || ''',''iteration_points'', ''be_r'', ''ohas_iter_transit_rail_closest'', true)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;   
-- 3.a.iii Calc the rail errors 
to_execute =  
  'CREATE TABLE ' || output_schema || '.ohas_jitter_rail_errors  as ' || 
  'SELECT ip.*, o.dist as be_0,  j.dist as be_1, ' || 
  '(o.dist - j.dist) as abs_err, ' || 
  '((o.dist - j.dist) / o.dist) as rel_err, ' || 
  '(abs(o.dist - j.dist) / o.dist) as absrel_err ' || 
  'FROM ' || output_schema || '.iteration_points_estkanon ip JOIN '  
  || output_schema || '.ohas_transit_rail_closest o on (o.sampn = ip.sampn) JOIN '  
  || output_schema || '.ohas_iter_transit_rail_closest j ' || 
  'ON (j.sampn = ip.sampn and j.iter_num = ip.iter_num)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
-- 3.b.i  Bus onto the ohas points   
to_execute =  
 'SELECT ' || function_schema || '.get_nn_to_sample_or_iteration(''' || input_schema ||  
 ''',''' || output_schema || ''',''ohas'', ''be_b'', ''ohas_transit_bus_closest'', false)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;   
-- 3.b.ii  Bus onto the iteration points   
to_execute =  
 72 
 
 'SELECT ' || function_schema || '.get_nn_to_sample_or_iteration(''' || input_schema ||  
 ''',''' || output_schema || ''',''iteration_points'', ''be_b'', ''ohas_iter_transit_bus_closest'', true)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;   
-- 3.b.iii Calc the bus errors 
to_execute =  
  'CREATE TABLE ' || output_schema || '.ohas_jitter_bus_errors  as select ip.*, o.dist as be_0, 
j.dist as be_1, (o.dist - j.dist) as abs_err, ((o.dist - j.dist) / o.dist) as rel_err, (abs(o.dist - j.dist) / 
o.dist) as absrel_err FROM ' || output_schema || '.iteration_points_estkanon ip JOIN ' || 
output_schema || '.ohas_transit_bus_closest o on (o.sampn = ip.sampn) JOIN ' || output_schema || 
'.ohas_iter_transit_bus_closest j on (j.sampn = ip.sampn and j.iter_num = ip.iter_num)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
--3.c.i Block group variables on to ohas points 
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE ' || output_schema || '.ohas_bg_be_measures AS SELECT ohas.sampn 
as sampn, geo_bg.geoid as bg_geo_id, int_dens.inter_dens as be_0_int_dens, int_dens.pop_dens 
as be_0_pop_dens, int_dens.emp_dens as be_0_emp_dens FROM '|| 
 input_schema || '.ohas JOIN ' || input_schema || '.geo_bg on ST_Within(ohas.geom, 
geo_bg.geom) JOIN ' || 
 input_schema || '.int_dens on (geo_bg.geoid = int_dens.geoid)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
--3.c.ii Block group variables onto the iteration points   
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE ' || output_schema || '.ohas_iter_bg_be_measures AS SELECT ip.sampn 
as sampn, ip.iter_num as iter_num, geo_bg.geoid as bg_geo_id, int_dens.inter_dens as 
be_1_int_dens, int_dens.pop_dens as be_1_pop_dens, int_dens.emp_dens as be_1_emp_dens 
FROM '|| 
 output_schema || '.iteration_points ip JOIN ' || input_schema || '.geo_bg on 
ST_Within(ip.geom, geo_bg.geom) JOIN ' || 
 input_schema || '.int_dens on (geo_bg.geoid = int_dens.geoid)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
--3.c.iii.a Block group variables errors  - intersection density    
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE ' || output_schema || '.ohas_jitter_int_errors as select ip.*, 
o.be_0_int_dens as be_0, j.be_1_int_dens as be_1, (j.be_1_int_dens - o.be_0_int_dens) as abs_err, 
((j.be_1_int_dens - o.be_0_int_dens) / o.be_0_int_dens) as rel_err, abs(((j.be_1_int_dens - 
o.be_0_int_dens) / o.be_0_int_dens)) as absrel_err FROM ' || output_schema || 
'.iteration_points_estkanon ip JOIN ' || output_schema || '.ohas_bg_be_measures o on (o.sampn = 
ip.sampn) JOIN ' || output_schema || '.ohas_iter_bg_be_measures j on (j.sampn = ip.sampn and 
j.iter_num = ip.iter_num)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
--3.c.iii.b Block group variables errors  - pop density    
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 to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE ' || output_schema || '.ohas_jitter_pop_errors as select ip.*, 
o.be_0_pop_dens as be_0, j.be_1_pop_dens as be_1, (j.be_1_pop_dens - o.be_0_pop_dens) as 
abs_err, ((j.be_1_pop_dens - o.be_0_pop_dens) / o.be_0_pop_dens) as rel_err, 
abs(((j.be_1_pop_dens - o.be_0_pop_dens) / o.be_0_pop_dens)) as absrel_err FROM ' || 
output_schema || '.iteration_points_estkanon ip JOIN ' || output_schema || '.ohas_bg_be_measures 
o on (o.sampn = ip.sampn)  JOIN ' || output_schema || '.ohas_iter_bg_be_measures j on (j.sampn = 
ip.sampn and j.iter_num = ip.iter_num)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
--3.c.iii.c Block group variables errors  - emp density    
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE '  
 || output_schema || '.ohas_jitter_emp_errors as select ip.*, o.be_0_emp_dens as be_0, 
j.be_1_emp_dens as be_1, (j.be_1_emp_dens - o.be_0_emp_dens) as abs_err, ((j.be_1_emp_dens 
- o.be_0_emp_dens) / o.be_0_emp_dens) as rel_err, abs(((j.be_1_emp_dens - o.be_0_emp_dens) 
/ o.be_0_emp_dens)) as absrel_err FROM '  
 || output_schema || '.iteration_points_estkanon ip JOIN '  
 || output_schema || '.ohas_bg_be_measures o on (o.sampn = ip.sampn)  JOIN '  
 || output_schema || '.ohas_iter_bg_be_measures j on (j.sampn = ip.sampn and j.iter_num = 
ip.iter_num)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
-- 4. SUMMARY STATS 
-- 4.a basic info about the ohas points   
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE '  
 || output_schema || '.ohas_info  as ' || 
 'SELECT o.sampn, o.geom, st_x(o.geom) as xcoord_0, st_y(o.geom) as ycoord_0, ' || 
 'blocks.tract10 as tract_0, blocks.blkgrp10 as group_0 FROM '  
 || input_schema || '.ohas o  JOIN '  
 || input_schema || '.geo_bg blocks on st_intersects (o.geom, blocks.geom) JOIN '  
 || input_schema || '.geo_tr tracts  on (blocks.tract10 = tracts.tract10)'; 
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
--4.a.i RMSE tables - emp 
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE '|| output_schema || '.rmse_emp as select '|| 
 'min(oi.sampn) as sampn,  '|| 
 'min(oi.tract_0) as tract_0, '||   
 'min(oi.group_0) as group_0, ' || 
 'min(oi.xcoord_0) as xcoord_0, '||   
 'min(oi.ycoord_0) as ycoord_0, '|| 
 'min(est_kanon) as min_kanon, '|| 
 'jit_functions.median(est_kanon::numeric) as med_kanon, '||  
 'max(est_kanon) as max_kanon, '|| 
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 'avg(est_kanon) as mean_kanon, '|| 
 'count(je.sampn) as num_sims, '|| 
 'min(je.be_0) as be_0,  '|| 
 'avg(je.be_1) as mean_be_1,  '|| 
 'min(je.be_1) as min_be_1,  '|| 
 'jit_functions.median(je.be_1) as med_be_1, '|| 
 'max(je.be_1) as max_be_1, '|| 
 'sum(abs(abs_err))/count(je.sampn) as mae, ' || 
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn)) as rmse, ' || 
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn))/avg(be_1) as nrmse, ' ||  
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn))/avg(be_1) * 100 as prmse from ' || 
 output_schema || '.ohas_info oi ' || 
 'LEFT JOIN ' || output_schema || '.ohas_jitter_emp_errors je ' || 
 'on (oi.sampn = je.sampn) group by oi.sampn';  
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
--4.a.ii RMSE tables - int 
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE '|| output_schema || '.rmse_int as select '|| 
 'min(oi.sampn) as sampn,  '|| 
 'min(oi.tract_0) as tract_0, '||   
 'min(oi.group_0) as group_0, ' || 
 'min(oi.xcoord_0) as xcoord_0, '||   
 'min(oi.ycoord_0) as ycoord_0, '|| 
 'min(est_kanon) as min_kanon, '|| 
 'jit_functions.median(est_kanon::numeric) as med_kanon, '||  
 'max(est_kanon) as max_kanon, '|| 
 'avg(est_kanon) as mean_kanon, '|| 
 'count(je.sampn) as num_sims, '|| 
 'min(je.be_0) as be_0,  '|| 
 'avg(je.be_1) as mean_be_1,  '|| 
 'min(je.be_1) as min_be_1,  '|| 
 'jit_functions.median(je.be_1) as med_be_1, '|| 
 'max(je.be_1) as max_be_1, '|| 
 'sum(abs(abs_err))/count(je.sampn) as mae, ' || 
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn)) as rmse, ' || 
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn))/avg(be_1) as nrmse, ' ||  
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn))/avg(be_1) * 100 as prmse from ' || 
 output_schema || '.ohas_info oi ' || 
 'LEFT JOIN ' || output_schema || '.ohas_jitter_int_errors je ' || 
 'on (oi.sampn = je.sampn) group by oi.sampn';  
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
--4.a.iii RMSE tables - pop 
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE '|| output_schema || '.rmse_pop as select '|| 
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 'min(oi.sampn) as sampn,  '|| 
 'min(oi.tract_0) as tract_0, '||   
 'min(oi.group_0) as group_0, ' || 
 'min(oi.xcoord_0) as xcoord_0, '||   
 'min(oi.ycoord_0) as ycoord_0, '|| 
 'min(est_kanon) as min_kanon, '|| 
 'jit_functions.median(est_kanon::numeric) as med_kanon, '||  
 'max(est_kanon) as max_kanon, '|| 
 'avg(est_kanon) as mean_kanon, '|| 
 'count(je.sampn) as num_sims, '|| 
 'min(je.be_0) as be_0,  '|| 
 'avg(je.be_1) as mean_be_1,  '|| 
 'min(je.be_1) as min_be_1,  '|| 
 'jit_functions.median(je.be_1) as med_be_1, '|| 
 'max(je.be_1) as max_be_1, '|| 
 'sum(abs(abs_err))/count(je.sampn) as mae, ' || 
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn)) as rmse, ' || 
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn))/avg(be_1) as nrmse, ' ||  
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn))/avg(be_1) * 100 as prmse from ' || 
 output_schema || '.ohas_info oi ' || 
 'LEFT JOIN ' || output_schema || '.ohas_jitter_pop_errors je ' || 
 'on (oi.sampn = je.sampn) group by oi.sampn';  
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
--4.a.iv RMSE tables - rail 
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE '|| output_schema || '.rmse_rail as select '|| 
 'min(oi.sampn) as sampn,  '|| 
 'min(oi.tract_0) as tract_0, '||   
 'min(oi.group_0) as group_0, ' || 
 'min(oi.xcoord_0) as xcoord_0, '||   
 'min(oi.ycoord_0) as ycoord_0, '|| 
 'min(est_kanon) as min_kanon, '|| 
 'jit_functions.median(est_kanon::numeric) as med_kanon, '||  
 'max(est_kanon) as max_kanon, '|| 
 'avg(est_kanon) as mean_kanon, '|| 
 'count(je.sampn) as num_sims, '|| 
 'min(je.be_0) as be_0,  '|| 
 'avg(je.be_1) as mean_be_1,  '|| 
 'min(je.be_1) as min_be_1,  '|| 
 'jit_functions.median(je.be_1) as med_be_1, '|| 
 'max(je.be_1) as max_be_1, '|| 
 'sum(abs(abs_err))/count(je.sampn) as mae, ' || 
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn)) as rmse, ' || 
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn))/avg(be_1) as nrmse, ' ||  
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn))/avg(be_1) * 100 as prmse from ' || 
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 output_schema || '.ohas_info oi ' || 
 'LEFT JOIN ' || output_schema || '.ohas_jitter_rail_errors je ' || 
 'on (oi.sampn = je.sampn) group by oi.sampn';  
RAISE INFO '%', to_execute;  
EXECUTE to_execute;  
--4.a.v RMSE tables - bus 
to_execute =  
 'CREATE TABLE '|| output_schema || '.rmse_bus as select '|| 
 'min(oi.sampn) as sampn,  '|| 
 'min(oi.tract_0) as tract_0, '||   
 'min(oi.group_0) as group_0, ' || 
 'min(oi.xcoord_0) as xcoord_0, '||   
 'min(oi.ycoord_0) as ycoord_0, '|| 
 'min(est_kanon) as min_kanon, '|| 
 'jit_functions.median(est_kanon::numeric) as med_kanon, '||  
 'max(est_kanon) as max_kanon, '|| 
 'avg(est_kanon) as mean_kanon, '|| 
 'count(je.sampn) as num_sims, '|| 
 'min(je.be_0) as be_0,  '|| 
 'avg(je.be_1) as mean_be_1,  '|| 
 'min(je.be_1) as min_be_1,  '|| 
 'jit_functions.median(je.be_1) as med_be_1, '|| 
 'max(je.be_1) as max_be_1, '|| 
 'sum(abs(abs_err))/count(je.sampn) as mae, ' || 
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn)) as rmse, ' || 
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn))/avg(be_1) as nrmse, ' ||  
 'sqrt((sum(abs_err ^ 2))/count(je.sampn))/avg(be_1) * 100 as prmse from ' || 
 output_schema || '.ohas_info oi ' || 
 'LEFT JOIN ' || output_schema || '.ohas_jitter_bus_errors je ' || 
 'on (oi.sampn = je.sampn) group by oi.sampn';  
RETURN TRUE; 
END;  
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql; 
 
create_function_jittery_median.sql 
-- From http://wiki.postgresql.org/wiki/Aggregate_Median 
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION jit_functions._final_median(numeric[]) 
   RETURNS numeric AS 
$$ 
   SELECT AVG(val) 
   FROM ( 
     SELECT val 
     FROM unnest($1) val 
     ORDER BY 1 
     LIMIT  2 - MOD(array_upper($1, 1), 2) 
     OFFSET CEIL(array_upper($1, 1) / 2.0) - 1 
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   ) sub; 
$$ 
LANGUAGE 'sql' IMMUTABLE; 
  
CREATE AGGREGATE jit_functions.median(numeric) ( 
  SFUNC=array_append, 
  STYPE=numeric[], 
  FINALFUNC=jit_functions._final_median, 
  INITCOND='{}' 
); 
 
runit.sh 
#!/bin/bash 
for my_schema in k_25_qtrmi k_50_qtrmi k_100_qtrmi k_250_qtrmi k_500_qtrmi k_25_halfmi 
k_50_halfmi k_100_halfmi k_250_halfmi k_500_halfmi k_25_onemi k_50_onemi k_100_onemi 
k_250_onemi k_500_onemi k_25_threehalfmi k_50_threehalfmi k_100_threehalfmi 
k_250_threehalfmi k_500_threehalfmi k_25_twomi k_50_twomi k_100_twomi k_250_twomi 
k_500_twomi 
  do 
   echo "Exporting $my_schema" 
   sed s/{MYSCHEMA}/$my_schema/g template_export.sql > $my_schema.sql 
   psql -hlocalhost -domc -f $my_schema.sql  
  done 
 
template_export.sql 
\! mkdir {MYSCHEMA} 
\copy {MYSCHEMA}.ohas_jitter_bus_errors to {MYSCHEMA}/ohas_jitter_bus_errors.csv  
WITH DELIMITER ',' CSV HEADER 
\copy {MYSCHEMA}.ohas_jitter_emp_errors to {MYSCHEMA}/ohas_jitter_emp_errors.csv  
WITH DELIMITER ',' CSV HEADER 
\copy {MYSCHEMA}.ohas_jitter_int_errors to {MYSCHEMA}/ohas_jitter_int_errors.csv  
WITH DELIMITER ',' CSV HEADER 
\copy {MYSCHEMA}.ohas_jitter_pop_errors to {MYSCHEMA}/ohas_jitter_pop_errors.csv  
WITH DELIMITER ',' CSV HEADER 
\copy {MYSCHEMA}.ohas_jitter_rail_errors to {MYSCHEMA}/ohas_jitter_rail_errors.csv  
WITH DELIMITER ',' CSV HEADER 
\copy {MYSCHEMA}.rmse_bus to {MYSCHEMA}/rmse_bus.csv  WITH DELIMITER ',' CSV 
HEADER 
\copy {MYSCHEMA}.rmse_emp to {MYSCHEMA}/rmse_emp.csv  WITH DELIMITER ',' CSV 
HEADER 
\copy {MYSCHEMA}.rmse_int to {MYSCHEMA}/rmse_int.csv  WITH DELIMITER ',' CSV 
HEADER 
\copy {MYSCHEMA}.rmse_pop to {MYSCHEMA}/rmse_pop.csv  WITH DELIMITER ',' CSV 
HEADER 
\copy {MYSCHEMA}.rmse_rail to {MYSCHEMA}/rmse_rail.csv  WITH DELIMITER ',' CSV 
HEADER 
 78 
 
\! pgsql2shp -f {MYSCHEMA}/donuts_clipped  -h localhost omc "SELECT ST_Multi(geom) as 
geom, sampn, geo_tr_id FROM {MYSCHEMA}.donuts_clipped WHERE not 
ST_IsEmpty(geom)" 
\! zip -qrv {MYSCHEMA}.zip {MYSCHEMA}/* 
\! rm -rf {MYSCHEMA} 
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